Topics in risk-sensitive stochastic control by Deshpande , Amogh
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/67915
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Topics in Risk-sensitive stochastic control.
by
Amogh Deshpande
Thesis
Submitted to the University of Warwick
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Statistics
September 2014
Contents
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Acknowledgments iii
Declarations iv
Abstract v
Chapter 1 Introduction. 1
1 Some key concepts in Stochastic Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Risk-sensitive control optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Fo¨llmer and Schweizer minimal martingale measure . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 A brief discussion on stochastic stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 A brief discussion on two player zero sum stochastic games . . . . . 11
6 Semi-Markov modulated jump diffusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7 Our Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 2 Game-theoretic approach to risk-sensitive bench marked
asset management. 19
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Problem Reformulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Verification lemma for the game PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 Solving the risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game . . . 32
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 3 On the role of the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale
measure in risk sensitive control asset management. 41
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Worst-Case risk sensitive zero-sum stochastic differential game . . . 45
i
3 An HJBI equation for game GII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 Solving game GII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter 4 Sufficient stochastic maximum principle for the optimal
control of semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion with an applica-
tion to financial optimization. 59
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2 Mathematical Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 The control problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Sufficient Stochastic Maximum principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5 Connection to dynamic programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
ii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, my sincerest regards to Prof. Saul D. Jacka for providing me
an opportunity to pursue doctoral studies at Warwick. This wonderful opportunity
would not have fructified had it not been for his spirited approach towards provid-
ing me the Chancellor’s scholarship of the University of Warwick. I wish to also
acknowledge Prof. Jane Hutton for contributing to having me here at Warwick,
sharing her bike and for un-tiringly arranging myriads of fun activities for PhD stu-
dents. These activities made me love UK like nothing else. I wish to express my
gratitude to the Department of Statistics at University of Warwick for providing me
an excellent research environment. Last but not the least, my whole hearted love to
my family; for supporting me at every step of my studies. Without their support
this day would not have been possible.
iii
Declarations
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not
been submitted in any previous application for any degree.
The work presented in the first topic is joint work with Prof. S.D. Jacka and it has
been accepted in Risk and Decision Analysis, refer [9].
The work presented in the second topic is an individual work of mine and has been
accepted in Journal of Applied Probability, refer [10].
The work presented in the third topic is an individual work of mine and has been
accepted in Stochastic analysis and applications, refer [11].
iv
Abstract
This thesis consists of three topics whose over-arching theme is based on risk-
sensitive stochastic control. In the first topic (chapter 2), we study a problem on
benchmark out-performance. We model this as a zero-sum risk-sensitive stochas-
tic game between an investor who as a player wants to maximize the risk-sensitive
criterion while the other player ( a stochastic benchmark) tries to minimize this
maximum risk-sensitive criterion. We obtain an explicit expression for the strate-
gies for both these two players. In the second topic (chapter 3), we consider a finite
horizon risk-sensitive asset management problem. We study it in the context of
a zero-sum stochastic game between an investor and the second player called the
“market world” which provides a probability measure. Via this game, we connect
two (somewhat) disparate areas in stochastics; namely, stochastic stability and risk-
sensitive stochastic control in mathematical finance. The connection is through the
Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale measure. We discuss the impact of this mea-
sure on the investor’s optimal strategy. In the third topic (chapter 4), we study
the sufficient stochastic maximum principle of semi-Markov modulated jump dif-
fusion. We study its application in the context of a quadratic loss minimization
problem. We also study the finite-horizon risk-sensitive optimization in relation to
the underlying sufficient stochastic maximum principle of a semi-markov modulated
diffusion.
v
Chapter 1
Introduction.
In this chapter, we first introduce the reader to the concept of sufficient stochastic
maximum principle. Here we provide this principle for a class of diffusion pro-
cess. We also introduce concepts of risk-sensitive stochastic control optimization,
Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale measure, stochastic stability, zero-sum two
player stochastic differential game and semi-Markov modulated jump diffusion in
that order. These ideas form key ingredients to the chapters to follow. Towards the
end of this chapter we briefly mention how each subsequent chapter relates to these
concepts.
1 Some key concepts in Stochastic Control.
The basic idea of stochastic control is to consider a family of controlled problems
by varying the initial state values and to derive some relations between the values
of the associated value function. This is called the dynamic programming prin-
ciple. This approach yields a certain nonlinear PDE of second order called the
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman or (HJB) equation. The first fundamental theorem
in stochastic control describes what is known as “necessary” stochastic maximum
principle. Roughly speaking, it states that if there exists an optimal control, then
it is simply associated to the easier problem of finding the maximum of a certain
real function in a particular control space. On the contrary, the sufficient stochastic
maximum states that if a certain real function is maximum for a particular control,
then that control is optimal. This is also termed the sufficient stochastic maximum
principle and constitutes what is called the second fundamental theorem in stochas-
tic control. Thus in short the sufficient stochastic maximum principle validates the
optimality of the candidate solution to the HJB equations. We elaborate on the
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sufficient stochastic maximum principle for a controlled diffusion as follows. We
borrow the following material from Pham [31].
Consider a controlled SDE modeled in Rn as
dXs = b(Xs, us)ds+ σ(Xs, us)dWs, X0 = x; (1.1)
whereW is a d-dimensional Brownian motion defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,F =
(F){t≥0},P). u = (us) is a process (progressively measurable w.r.t to F) taking val-
ues in A ⊂ Rm. The measurable functions b : Rn×A→ Rn and σ : Rn×A→ Rn×d
satisfy a uniform Lipschitz condition in A : i.e. ∃K ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Rn, ∀ a ∈ A,
|b(x, a)− b(y, a)|+ |σ(x, a)− σ(y, a)| ≤ K|x− y|. (1.2)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ ∞.
Finite horizon problem.
We fix a finite horizon 0 < T < ∞. We denote by A the set of control processes u
such that
E
∫ T
0
[|b(0, ut)|2 + |σ(0, ut)|2]dt <∞. (1.3)
It is known that the conditions given by (1.2) and (1.3) ensure that for u ∈ A and
for any initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, existence and uniqueness of a strong
solution to the SDE (1.1) (with random coefficients) starting from x at s = t is
guaranteed.
Functional objective Let f : [0, T ]×Rn×A→ R and g : Rn → R be two measurable
functions where g is lower-bounded or g satisfies a quadratic growth condition given
by |g(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2) ∀ x ∈ Rn for some constant C independent of x. For
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn we denote by A(t, x) the non-empty subset of controls u in A
such that
E[
∫ T
t
|f(s,Xt,xs , us)|ds] <∞. (1.4)
We can then define the gain function:
J(t, x, u) = E[
∫ T
t
f(s,Xt,xs , us)ds+ g(X
t,x
T )], (1.5)
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for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn and u ∈ A(t, x). The objective is to maximize over control
processes the gain function J by introducing the associated value function
ν(t, x) = sup
u∈A(t,x)
J(t, x, u). (1.6)
Remarks
1. Given an initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn, we say that uˆ ∈ A(t, x) is an
optimal control if ν(t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ)
2. A control process u of the form us = u(s,X
t,x
s ) for some measurable function u
from [0, T ]× Rn into A, is called a Markovian control.
Dynamic programming principle (DPP)
It is an important concept in the theory of stochastic control. It is formulated
in the context of controlled diffusion for the finite time horizon as follows:
Theorem 1. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn. Then we have
ν(t, x) = sup
u∈A(t,x)
inf
θ∈Tt
E[
∫ θ
t
f(s,Xt,xs , us)ds+ ν(θ,X
t,x
θ )] (1.7)
where Tt is the set of stopping times valued in [t, T ]. The interpretation of the DPP
is that the optimization problem can now be split in two parts: an optimal control
on the whole time interval [t, T ] may be obtained by first searching for an optimal
control from time θ given the state value Xt,xθ , i.e compute ν(θ,X
t,x
θ ) and then max-
imizing over controls on [t, θ] the quantity E[
∫ θ
t f(s,X
t,x
s , us)ds+ ν(θ,X
t,x
θ )].
The HJB equation is the infinitesimal version of the dynamic programming
principle: it describes the local behavior of the value function when we send the stop-
ping time θ to t in (1.7). The HJB equation is also called the dynamic programming
equation or DPE and is given by,
−∂ν
∂t
(t, x)−H(t, x,Dxν(t, x), D2xν(t, x)) = 0 ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, (1.8)
where for (t, x, p,M) ∈ [0, T )× Rn × Rn × Sn
H(t, x, p,M) = sup
a∈A
[b(x, a) · p+ 1
2
tr(σσ
′
(x, a)M) + f(t, x, a)]
ν(T, x) = g(x) ∀ x ∈ Rn. (1.9)
The function H is called the Hamiltonian of the associated control problem. The
crucial step in the classical approach to dynamic programming consists of proving
that given a smooth solution to the HJB equation, this candidate coincides with
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the value function. As stated earlier, this result is called the verification lemma and
allows us to obtain an optimal Markovian control as a byproduct. Given the diffusion
dynamics presented earlier, the following would be the corresponding verification
lemma.
Let C1,2([0, T )× Rn) be the space of functions of once differentiable in t and twice
differentiable in x while C0([0, T )× Rn) is the space of continuous functions.
Theorem 2. Define La to be the generator of the controlled diffusion process
(1.1). Let w be a C1,2([0, T )×Rn)∩C0([0, T ]×Rn), functions satisfying the growth
condition , i.e. there exist a constant C such that
|w(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2). ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
(i) Suppose that
−∂w
∂t
(t, x)− sup
a∈A
[Law(t, x) + f(t, x, a)] ≥ 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, (1.10)
w(T, x) ≥ g(x) x ∈ Rn. (1.11)
Then w ≥ ν on [0, T ]× Rn.
(ii) Suppose further that w(T, ·) = g(·), and there exists a measurable function
uˆ(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, valued in A such that
− ∂w
∂t
(t, x)− sup
a∈A
[Law(t, x) + f(t, x, a)]
= −∂w
∂t
(t, x)− Luˆ(t,x)w(t, x)− f(t, x, uˆ(t, x)) = 0. (1.12)
and the SDE
dXs = b(Xs, uˆ(s,Xs))ds+ σ(Xs, uˆ(s,Xs))dWs
admits a unique solution, denoted by Xˆt,xs , given an initial condition Xt = x, and
the process {uˆ(t, Xˆt,xs ; t ≤ s ≤ T} lies in A(t, x). Then
w = ν on [0, T ]× Rn,
and uˆ is an optimal Markovian control.
Note that when the control space A is reduced to a singleton, the verification
lemma is a version of the Feynman-Kac formula.
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The usual steps to derive the optimal control are the following:
Step 1. Derive the HJB equation.
Step 2. Verfication step: Show that the smooth solution is the value function.
Step 3. As a byproduct, obtain an optimal feedback control.
These steps will be a recurring theme in the chapters to follow.
2 Risk-sensitive control optimization
The risk-sensitive control-optimization or(RSCO) balances an investor’s interest in
maximizing the expected growth rate of wealth against his aversion to risk due to
deviations of the realized rate from the expectation. The subjective notion of in-
vestor’s risk aversion is parameterized by a single variable, say θ. More formally, we
write the finite horizon risk-sensitive optimization criterion as :
max JT,h := −1
θ
logE[e−θF (T,h)], (2.1)
where F (T, h) is the time-T - value reward function corresponding to control h. In
the optimal investment problem we take F (T, h) = log V (T ) where V (t) is the time
t-value of the portfolio corresponding to portfolio asset allocation h.
An asymptotic expansion around θ = 0 for the above criterion with F :=
F (t, h) yields
JT,h = −1
θ
log [1− θE[F ] + θ
2
2
E[F 2] + ....],
= −1
θ
log [1− (θE[F ]− θ
2
2
E[F 2]) + ....],
=
1
θ
[(θE[F ] +
θ2
2
E[F 2]) +
1
2
(θE[F ] +
θ2
2
E[F 2])
2
+ ...],
= E[F ]− θ
2
E[F 2] +
θ
2
(E[F ])2,
= E[F (T, h)]− θ
2
V ar(F (T, h)) +O(θ2).
where O(·) as usual denotes the big-O symbol. From this expression it is clear this
criterion compromises between maximizing the portfolio return while penalizing its
riskiness. Values of θ > 0 correspond to a risk-averse investor, θ < 0 to a risk-seeking
investor and θ = 0 to a risk-neutral investor who maximizes
JT,h := E[F (T, h)].
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The optimal expected utility function depends on θ and is a generalization of
the traditional stochastic control approach to utility optimization in the sense that
now the degree of risk aversion of the investor is explicitly parameterized through θ
rather than importing it into the problem via an exogenous utility function. There
has been a substantial amount of research on the infinite-time horizon ergodic prob-
lem:
max J¯∞ where
J¯∞ = lim inf
t→∞ −
1
θ
t−1 logE[e−θF (t,h)]. (2.2)
However, in this thesis we will restrict to studying the finite horizon risk sensitive
control-optimization for the case when V is a diffusion process.
3 Fo¨llmer and Schweizer minimal martingale measure
We now discuss in brief the concept of minimal martingale measure. The material
is borrowed from the work of Fo¨llmer and Schweizer [17]. Let X = (Xt)0≤t≤T be
a semi-martingale with continuous paths on some probability space (Ω,F , P ) with
right-continuous filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T . The Doob-Meyer decomposition states that
X = X0 +M +A. (3.1)
where M = (Mt)0≤t≤T is a local martingale and a predictable process A = (At)0≤t≤T
with paths of bounded variation. In particular M is a square integrable martingale
under P . Consider a contingent claim at time T given by a random variable
H ∈ L2(Ω,FT , P ). (3.2)
In order to hedge against this claim, we want to use a portfolio strategy which
involves a stock X and a riskless bond B ≡ 1, which yields a random payment
H at the terminal time T . Let ξt and ηt denote the amounts of stock and bond,
respectively held at time t. The value of the resulting portfolio at time t is given by
Vt = ξtXt + ηt 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.3)
and the cost accumulated up to time t by
Ct = Vt −
∫ t
0
ξsdXs 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.4)
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We only admit strategies (ξ, η) such that the process V = Vt0≤t≤T and C = Ct(0≤t≤T )
are square -integrable and have right continuous paths and satisfy
VT = H, P − a.s. (3.5)
We also require the integrability condition
E
[ ∫ T
0
ξ2sd < X >s +(
∫ T
0
|ξs|d|A|s)
2]
<∞, (3.6)
where < X > denotes pathwise-defined quadratic variation of the process X and
|A| the total variation of the process A. This ensures that the stochastic integral
in (3.4) is well-defined. Such strategies are called admissible. For example suppose
our claim H admits the following representation
H = H0 +
∫ T
0
ξHs dXs, P − a.s. (3.7)
Then for the choice of strategy
ξ := ξH ; η := V − ξ ·X;Vt := H0 +
∫ t
0
ξHs dXs 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.8)
This strategy is admissible and is self-financing i.e. Ct = CT = H0.
If we suppose that the market is complete then every contingent claim is
attainable. This allows for complete elimination of risk involved in handling an
option. This is no longer possible in an incomplete market and a typical claim
will carry an intrinsic risk, and the problem consists in finding a dynamic portfolio
strategy which reduces the actual risk to that intrinsic component. We discuss this
further.
In the absence of arbitrage there exists an equivalent probability measure P ∗
such that X is P ∗-martingale; which implies that X is a P -semimartingale. First
let us start with the simple case wherein X is a P -martingale i.e P ∗ = P . In that
context Fo¨llmer-Sondermann introduced the following risk-minimization criterion
wherein one looks for an admissible strategy that minimizes at each time t the
remaining risk
Rt(pi) := E[(C˜T (pi)− C˜t(pi))2 | Ft], (3.9)
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for any other admissible strategy pi. We say that an admissible strategy pi∗ is risk
minimizing if
Rt(pi
∗) ≤ Rt(pi). (3.10)
H is attainable provided this remaining risk is brought down to 0. However the risk-
minimizing strategy will no longer be self-financing but it will be mean self-financing
in the sense that
E[CT (pi)− Ct(pi)|Ft] = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.11)
i.e. C is a martingale. There exists a unique risk-minimizing strategy and it is tied
down to the existence of the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition given by
H = H0 +
∫ T
0
ξHs dXs + L
h
T ,
with H0 ∈ L2(Ω,F0, P ), where LH = (LHt )0≤t≤T is a square integrable martingale
orthogonal to X under P .
Let us now consider the general incomplete case where P ≈ P ∗, but where
P itself is no longer a martingale measure. In this situation in general there exist
NO risk-minimizing strategy because unlike the martingale case discussed before,
the issue of determining hedging strategies gets subtle and a locally risk-minimizing
criterion is introduced. Intuitively the reason for the failure is a compatibility issue.
We minimize Rt(pi) over all admissible continuations from t to obtain the t-optimal
continuation. But for s < t, the s- optimal continuation for (s,T] ⊃ (t,T] is different
from t-optimal continuation when X is not P -martingale. Hence we must minimize
the residual risk “locally”. This condition may be thought of as an infinitesimal
analogue of condition (3.10). We say a strategy is locally risk-minimizing if for any
t < T , the remaining risk is minimal under all infinitesimal perturbations of the
strategy at time t.
The concept of “Local Risk” minimization is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. A small perturbation ∆ = {δt, t} is bounded variation corre-
sponding to semimartingale decomposition of Xt and δT = T = 0. Let pi be an
arbitrary strategy, τ = (ti)(0≤i≤n) be a partition of [0, T ]. We set
rτ (pi,∆) =
∑
(ti,ti+1)∈τ
Rti(pi + ∆I(ti,ti+1))−Rti(pi)
E[
∫ ti+1
ti
σ2X2t dt|Fi]
I(ti,ti+1)(t). (3.12)
An admissible strategy pi is called Locally Risk Minimizing if lim infn→∞ rτn(pi,∆) ≥
0 a.e for every increasing 0-convergent sequence (τn) of partitions of [0,T].
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The idea of local risk-minimization is equivalent to the following property
Condition : The cost process C is square-integrable martingale orthogonal to M
under P .
Optimal strategies in the case of market incompleteness can now be defined as
follows
Definition 2. An admissible strategy (η, ξ) is called optimal, if the associated cost
process C satisfies the above condition .
Existence of an optimal strategy is equivalent to the decomposition
H = H0 +
∫ T
0
ξHs dXs + L
H
T , (3.13)
with H0 ∈ L2(Ω,F0, P ) and LH = (LHt )0≤t≤T being a square-integrable martingale
orthogonal to M
In order to compute locally Risk minimizing hedging strategy, one needs to
determine an EMM, more specifically a minimal EMM P ∗ such that X is a P ∗
-martingale. We define minimal martingale measure as follows.
Definition 3. An EMM P ∗ ≈ P is said to be minimal if P ∗ = P on F0, and if
any square integrable P -martingale which is orthogonal to M under P remains a
martingale under P ∗.
Remarks
(i) Measure P ∗ exist and is unique.
(ii) The MMM preserves orthogonality. In the sense that for any square integrable
P martingale L that is orthogonal to martingale part M under P is also orthogo-
nal to process X under P ∗. Hence the term “minimal” for martingale measure is
motivated by the fact that apart from turning X into a martingale, this measure
disturbs the overall martingale and orthogonality structure as little as possible.
Hence after obtaining an minimal martingale measure, we proceed to deter-
mine an admissible “local” risk minimizing hedging strategy from (3.8)
We now provide an example explaining the minimal martingale measure.
The discounted stock price process is a P semi-martingale given by
dSˆ(t) = (µ(t)− r(t))dt+ σ(t)dB(t).
Let Sˆ be 1-dimensional, R-valued and driven by, say, a 1-dimensional Brownian
motions B but with the underlying filtration generated by two possibly independent
brownian motions B and B˜(say). The market is expectedly incomplete, and with
the assumption of no-arbitrage there exists many equivalent martingale measures to
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choose from for pricing purpose. Let the time horizon T <∞. The unique EMM is
obtained by the following change of measure formula as follows
dQ
dP
|FT , Z(T ), (3.14)
where
dZ(t) = γ(t)Z(t)dB(t). (3.15)
γ(t) is chosen so as to make Sˆ a martingale under Q. (3.14) can be rewritten as
Z(t) = 1 +
∫ t
0
γ(s)Z(s)dB(s), (3.16)
where
γ(s) =
(µ(t)− r(t))
σ(t)
. (3.17)
We now show that the EMM is in fact the MMM.
Lemma 3. The martingale measure given by (3.14) is an MMM.
Proof Under P , Sˆ satisfies,
Sˆ(t) = Sˆ(0) +
∫ t
0
σ(s)Sˆ(s)dB(s) +
∫ t
0
(µ(s)− r(s))Sˆ(s)ds,
= Sˆ(0) +W (t) +A(t) (3.18)
whereW (t) =
∫ t
0 σ(s)Sˆ(s)dB(s) is a P -martingale andA(t) =
∫ t
0 (µ(s)− r(s))Sˆ(s)ds
is a continuous,adapted process. Therefore (3.18) gives a Doob decomposition of Sˆ
under P . Consider now an L2(P )-martingale N which is orthogonal to W so that
< N,W >= 0. Therefore < N,Z >= 0 for Z given by (3.15) i.e N is orthogonal to
Z. This obviously implies that N is a Q-local martingale. Now, since by assump-
tion N,Z ∈ L2(P ), by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality NZ ∈ L1(P ). Hence by the
result in Proposition 1.23 of Revuz and Yor [32], N is a Q-martingale.
Thus N is an L2(P )-martingale such that < N,W >= 0 ⇒ N is a Q-
martingale as well.
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4 A brief discussion on stochastic stability
Deterministic stability is a branch of the qualitative theory of dynamical systems.
The majority of the presently available work that are described as stability results
pertain to certain qualitative and quantitative (which do not involve the actual com-
putation of a solution) properties of differential equations. Consider the differential
equation dxdt = f(x, t) with initial condition x0 belonging to a set R. R may vary
but will always be non-empty bounded open set containing the origin. Let P be a
set containing R. A typical stability question is as follows: Let P be given. Is there
any R such that if x0 ∈ R , then xt ∈ P for all finite t?
Stochastic analogies to the deterministic problem can be easily drawn. For
example, let xt be a right-continuous, strong-Markov process such that its initial
value x0 is deterministic and lies in an open set R that contains the origin. Let
R ⊂ P . The analogous question for the finite time horizon would be:
Is there an R such that if Px{xt /∈ P, t < ∞} ≤ ρ < 1 for some given ρ,P and any
x in R?
In an asymptotic sense, we have the following possible candidate criterion
for stochastic stability.
Definition 4. Almost-sure exponential stability
The trivial solution of a stochastic differential equation is almost surely exponen-
tially stable if
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log |X(t)| < 0 a.s. ∀x ∈ Rr a.s.
5 A brief discussion on two player zero sum stochastic
games
The following treatment closely follows the seminal article of Fleming and Souganidis
[16]. Consider a finite-horizon, stochastic differential game (SDG) with state variable
in Rd and horizon T > 0. The state dynamics are given by,
dXs = f(s,Xs, Ys, Zs)ds+ σ(s,Xs, Ys, Zs)dWs s ∈ (t, T ]
Xt = x x ∈ Rd, (5.1)
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and the pay-off by,
J(x, t, Y·, Z·) = Ext[
∫ T
t
h(s,Xs, Ys, Zs)ds+ g(XT )], (5.2)
where W· is a standard M -dimensional Brownian motion, Y·, Z· are stochastic pro-
cesses taking values in some compact subsets Y and Z.
Assumptions (A1):
The functions f , σ and h are bounded, uniformly continuous and Lipschitiz contin-
uous with respect to (x, t) uniformly in (y, z) ∈ Y × Z. Function g is bounded and
Lipschitz continuous.
The idea behind this game is that there are two players I and II. Player I
controls Y· and wishes to maximize J over all choice of Z·. On the other hand, player
II controls Z· and tries to minimize J over all choices of Y·. Instantaneous switches
of Y· and Z· are possible in continuous time and to avoid this two approximate
games namely, lower and upper games are introduced. In the lower game, player II
is allowed to know Ys before choosing Zs, while the upper game player I chooses Ys
knowing Zs. Now consider the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation given by
ut +H
−(D2u,Du, x, t) = 0 Rd × [0, T ],
u = g on Rd × {T}, (5.3)
and
ut +H
+(D2u,Du, x, t) = 0 Rd × [0, T ],
u = g on Rd × {T}, (5.4)
where (for A being a symmetric d× d matrix, p, x ∈ Rd and t ∈ [0, T ]),
H−(A, p, x, t) = max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z
[trace(
1
2
a(t, x, y, z) ·A+ f(t, x, y, z) · p+ h(t, x, y, z)],(5.5)
H+(A, p, x, t) = min
z∈Z
max
y∈Y
[trace(
1
2
a(t, x, y, z) ·A+ f(t, x, y, z) · p+ h(t, x, y, z)],(5.6)
with a = σσ
′
. Equations (5.3) and (5.4) corresponds to lower and upper value
of the game and are well-known not to have global smooth solutions in general.
Once the notion of an upper and a lower value function is introduced we pursue the
task of proving that these functions are weak(viscosity) solutions of the associated
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Bellman-Isaacs equations.
We introduce the concepts of admissible controls and admissible strategies.
The sample space for (5.1) is defined as follows. For every t ∈ [0, T ] let
Ωwt = {w ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) : wt = 0}. (5.7)
Let Fwt,s denote the σ-algebra generated by the paths up to time s in Ωwt . When,
provided with a Wiener measure Pwt on Fwt,T , Ωwt becomes canonical sample space
of (5.1). We also define the space
Ωwt,s = {w ∈ C([t, s];Rd) : wt = 0}, (5.8)
for 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T . Define
w1 = w |[t,τ ],
w2 = w − w |[t,τ ],
piw = (w1, w2). (5.9)
The map pi : Ωwt → Ωw[t,τ ] ⊗ Ωwτ ; induces the identification
Ωwt = Ω
w
t,τ ⊗ Ωwτ . (5.10)
Moreover, w = pi−1(w1, w2). As well, Pwt = Pwt,τ ⊗ Pwτ , where Pwt,τ and Pwτ are
Wiener measures on Ωwt,τ and Ω
w
τ respectively. We provide the following definition
for control spaces.
Definition 5. An admissible control Y· (resp.Z·) for player I(resp. II) on [t, T ]
is an Fwt,s-progressively measurable process taking values in Y (resp. Z). The set
of all admissible controls for player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is denoted by M(t) (resp.
N(t)).
Definition 6. An admissible strategy α (resp. β) for player I (resp. player II)
on [t, T ] is a mapping α : N(t) → M(t) (resp. β : M(t) → N(t)) such that if
Pwt (Z· = Z˜·a.e.in[t, s]) = 1 then Pwt (α(Z·) = α(Z˜·) a.e. in [t, s])=1. (resp. for
Player II) on [t, s] for every s ∈ [t, T ].
The set of admissible strategies of player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is denoted by
Γ(t) (resp. ∆(t)). In brief, controls should depend on the past of the Brownian
motion and the strategies should only depends on the past of the controls. Note
that for Y· = α[Z·], where Z· ∈ ∆(t) and α ∈ Γ(t), there exists a unique pathwise
solution for X based on assumptions (A1) on f and σ and on controls Y and Z.
13
We now define the notions of the lower and upper value for the stochastic
differential game related to objective (5.2). The intuitive idea being, choosing the
controls at time s, the player who moves first (maximizing player for the lower game,
minimizing player for the upper game) is allowed to use the past of the Brownian
motion W· driving X· up to time s, while the player with the advantage (player II
for the lower game, player I for the upper game) is allowed to use the past of both
W· and the other player’s control.
Definition 7. The lower value of SDG (5.1)-(5.2) with initial data (x, t) is given
by,
V (x, t) = inf
β∈∆(t)
sup
Y·∈M(t)
J(x, t;Y·, β). (5.11)
The upper value of the game is given by
U(x, t) = inf
α∈Γ(t)
sup
Z·∈N(t)
J(x, t;α,Z·). (5.12)
We are really interested in coming up with value functions which satisfy the dynamic
programming principle. It turns out that the functions U and V do so for a restricted
class of strategies called r-strategies. For the same we define for t¯ < t < τ and
Y· ∈ M(t¯) and Pwt¯,t-a.e. w1 ∈ Ωwt¯,t, the map Y (w1) : [t, T ] × Ωwt → Y given by
Y (w1)(w2)r = Y (w1, w2)r is an admissible control for player I, i.e. Y (w1) ∈ M(t).
Similar observation holds for player II.
Definition 8. An r-strategy β for player II on [t, T ] is an admissible strategy
with the following properties: For every t¯ < t < τ and Y· ∈M(t¯) the map (r, w)→
β[Y (w1)](w2)r is (F0t,τ ⊗ Fwt¯,τ ,F0Z) measurable. The set of r-strategies of player II
on [t, T ] is denoted by ∆1(t). Similarly r-strategies for player I with their collection
denoted by Γ1(t).
Definition 9. The r-lower and the r-upper value of the SDG with initial data
(x, t) are given by,
V1(x, t) = inf
β∈∆1(t)
sup
Y·∈M(t)
J(x, t;Y·, β), (5.13)
and
U1(x, t) = sup
α∈Γ1(t)
inf
Z·∈N(t)
J(x, t;α,Z·). (5.14)
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The r-value functions turn out to satisfy the two following inequalities .
Proposition 4. For t, τ ∈ [0, T ] be such that t < τ . For every x ∈ Rd we have
V1(x, t) ≤ inf
β∈∆1(t)
sup
Y·∈M(t)
Ext[
∫ τ
t
h(s,Xs, Ys, β[Y·]s)ds+ V1(Xτ , τ)]. (5.15)
U1(x, t) ≥ sup
α∈Γ1(t)
inf
Z·∈N(t)
Ext[
∫ τ
t
h(s,Xs, Ys, β[Y·]s)ds+ V1(Xτ , τ)]. (5.16)
We refer to this inequality (5.15) as sub-optimal dynamic programming principle and
to the inequality (5.16) as super-optimal dynamic programming principle. These in-
equalities coupled with a semi-discretization argument developed by Fleming and
Souganidis [16] yield that the lower and upper value functions are the unique vis-
cosity solutions of the game and that they satisfy the principle of dynamic program-
ming. We direct the interested reader to the proofs in this article.
6 Semi-Markov modulated jump diffusions
The finite state semi-Markov process is a generalization of the Markov chain in
which the sojourn time distribution is any general distribution. We consider a semi-
Markov modulated jump-diffusion process in which the drift, diffusion and the jump
kernel of the jump-diffusion process is modulated by a semi-Markov process. We
introduce some notation before we describe the semi-Markov modulated jump dif-
fusion process.
• Let R: be the reals
• r,M : be any positive integers greater than 1.
• X = {1, ...,M}.
• v′ , A′ : the transpose of the vector v and matrix A respectively.
• ||v||: Euclidean norm of a vector v.
• |A|: norm of a matrix A.
• tr(A): trace of a square matrix A.
We assume that the probability space (Ω,F , {F(t)},P) is complete with fil-
tration {F(t)}t≥0 and is right-continuous and F(0) contains all P null sets. Let
{θ(t)}t≥0 be a semi-Markov process adapted to filtration {F(t)}t≥0 taking values in
X with transition probability pij and conditional holding time distribution F h(t|i).
Thus if 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... are times when jumps occur, then
P (θ(tn+1) = j, tn+1 − tn ≤ t|θ(tn) = i) = pijF h(t|i). (6.1)
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Matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M} is irreducible and for each i, F h(·|i) has continuously differ-
entiable and bounded density fh(·|i). For a fixed t, let n(t) , max{n : tn ≤ t} and
Y (t) , t − tn(t). Thus Y (t) represents the amount of time the process θ(t) is at
the current state after the last jump. The process (θ(t), Y (t))defined on (Ω,F ,P) is
jointly Markov and the differential generator L given as follows Chap.2 of [22]
Lφ(i, y) = d
dy
φ(i, y) +
fh(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)
∑
j 6=i,j∈X
pij [φ(j, 0)− φ(i, y)]. (6.2)
for φ : X × R+ → R a C1 function.
We first represent the semi-Markov process θ(t) as a stochastic integral with
respect to a Poisson random measure. With that perspective in mind, embed X in
RM by identifying i with ei ∈ RM . For y ∈ [0,∞) i, j ∈ X , define
λij(y) = pij
fh(y/i)
1− F h(y/i) ≥ 0 and ∀ i 6= j,
λii(y) = −
M∑
j∈X ,j 6=i
λij(y) ∀ i ∈ X .
For i 6= j ∈ X , y ∈ R+ let Λij(y) be consecutive (with respect to lexico-
graphic ordering on X×X ) left-closed, right-open intervals of the real line, each hav-
ing length λij(y). Define the functions h¯ : X×R+×R→ Rr and g¯ : X×R+×R→ R+
by
h¯(i, y, z) =
{
j − i if z ∈ Λij(y)
0 otherwise
g¯(i, y, z) =
{
y if z ∈ Λij(y), j 6= i
0 otherwise
LetM(R+×R) be the set of all nonnegative integer-valued σ-finite measures
on Borel σ-field of (R+ × R). The process {θ˜(t), Y (t)} is defined by the following
stochastic integral equations:
θ˜(t) = θ˜(0) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
h¯(θ˜(u−), Y (u−), z)N1(du, dz),
Y (t) = t−
∫ t
0
∫
R
g¯(θ˜(u−), Y (u−), z)N1(du, dz),
(6.3)
where N1(dt, dz) is an M(R+ × R)-valued Poisson random measure with inten-
sity dtm(dz) independent of the X -valued random variable θ˜(0), where m(·) is a
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Lebesgue measure on R. As usual, by definition Y (t) represents the amount of time
process θ˜(t) is at the current state after the last jump. We define the correspond-
ing compensated or centered one- dimensional Poisson measure as N˜1(ds, dz) =
N1(ds, dz) − dsm(dz). It was shown in Theorem 2.1 of Ghosh and Goswami [20]
that θ˜(t) is a semi-Markov process with transition probability matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M}
with conditional holding time distributions F h(y|i). Since, by definition θ(t) is also
a semi-Markov process with transition probability matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M} with condi-
tional holding time distributions F h(y|i) defined on the same underlying probability
space, by equivalence, θ˜(t) = θ(t) for t ≥ 0.
Remark The semi-Markov process with conditional density fh(y|i) = λ˜ie−λ˜iy for
some λ˜i > 0, i = 1, 2...,M , is in fact a Markov chain.
We now formally introduce the semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion pro-
cess. Let U ⊂ Rr be a closed subset. Let B0 be the family of Borel sets Γ ⊂ Rr
whose closure Γ¯ does not contain 0. For an Borel set B ⊂ Γ, the one-dimensional
Poisson random measure N(t, B) counts the number of jumps on [0, t] with values in
B. For a predictable process u : [0, T ]× Ω→ U with left-continuous, right-limited
paths, consider the controlled process X with given initial condition X(0) = x ∈ Rr
given by
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dW (t)
+
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t)), γ)N(dt, dγ), (6.4)
where X(t) ∈ Rr and W (t) = (W1(t), ...,Wr(t)) is r-dimensional standard Brownian
motion. The coefficients b(·, ·, ·, ·) : [0, T ]×Rr×U ×X → Rr,σ(·, ·, ·, ·) : [0, T ]×Rr×
U × X → Rr × Rr and g(·, ·, ·, ·, ·) : [0, T ] × Rr × U × X × Γ → Rr are assumed to
satisfy the usual assumptions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of solution
to (6.4).
7 Our Contribution
The thesis consists of the following three topics.
Q.1 The first chapter is based on an article titled as “Game-theoretic approach to
risk-sensitive benchmarked asset management.” Refer [9].
In this chapter we consider a game theoretic approach to the Risk-Sensitive
Benchmarked Asset Management problem (RSBAM) of Davis and Lleo [8]. In par-
ticular, we consider a stochastic differential game between two players, namely, the
investor who has a power utility while the second player represents the market which
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tries to minimize the expected payoff of the investor. The market does this by mod-
ulating a stochastic benchmark that the investor needs to outperform. We obtain
an explicit expression for the optimal pair of strategies for both the players under
certain conditions.
Q.2 The second chapter is based on an article titled “On the role of Fo¨llmer-
Schweizer minimal martingale measure in Risk Sensitive control Asset Manage-
ment.” Refer [10].
Kuroda and Nagai [26] state that the factor process in risk-sensitive control
asset management (RSCAM) is stable under the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal mar-
tingale measure . Fleming and Sheu [15] and more recently Fo¨llmer and Schweizer
[18] have observed that the role of the minimal martingale measure in this portfolio
optimization is yet to be established. We aim to address this question by explicitly
connecting the optimal wealth allocation to the minimal martingale measure. We
achieve this by using a “trick” of observing this problem in the context of model
uncertainty via a two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game between the in-
vestor and an antagonistic market that provides a probability measure.
Q.3 The third chapter is based on an article titled as “Sufficient stochastic max-
imum principle for the optimal control of semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion
with application to Financial optimization.” Refer [11].
In this topic we provide a sufficient stochastic maximum principle for the
optimal control of a semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion process in which the
drift, diffusion and the jump kernel of the jump-diffusion process is modulated by a
semi-Markov process. We also connect the sufficient stochastic maximum principle
with the dynamic programming equation. We apply our results to finite horizon
risk-sensitive control portfolio optimization problem and to a quadratic loss mini-
mization problem.
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Chapter 2
Game-theoretic approach to
risk-sensitive bench marked
asset management.
Abstract
In this chapter we consider a game theoretic approach to the Risk-Sensitive Bench-
marked Asset Management problem (RSBAM) of Davis and Lleo [8]. In particular,
we consider a stochastic differential game between two players, namely, the investor
who has a power utility while the second player represents the market which tries to
minimize the expected payoff of the investor. The market does this by modulating a
stochastic benchmark that the investor needs to outperform. We obtain an explicit
expression for the optimal pair of strategies as for both the players.
1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall develop a game theoretic version of a continuous time
optimization model with risk-sensitive control approach more specifically termed as
Risk-sensitive control portfolio optimization (RSCPO). The RSCPO balances an
investor’s interest in maximizing the expected growth rate of wealth against his
aversion to risk due to deviations of the realized rate from the expectation. The
subjective notion of investor’s risk aversion is parameterized by a single variable,
say θ. More formally,we write the finite horizon risk-sensitive optimization criterion
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as :
max JT,h := −1
θ
logE[e−θF (T,h)],
where F (T, h) is the time-T value reward function corresponding to control h. In
the optimal investment problem we take F (T, h) = log V (T ) where V (t) is the time
t-value of the portfolio corresponding to portfolio asset allocation h. An asymptotic
expansion around θ = 0 for the above criterion yields
JT,h = E[F (T, h)]− θ
2
V ar(F (T, h)) +O(θ2).
From this expression it is clear this criterion compromises between maximizing the
portfolio return while penalizing the riskiness . The optimal expected utility function
depends on θ and is a generalization of the traditional stochastic control approach to
utility optimization in the sense that now the degree of risk aversion of the investor
is explicitly parameterized through θ rather than importing it in the problem via
an exogenous utility function. Values of θ > 0 correspond to a risk-averse investor,
θ < 0 to a risk-seeking investor and θ = 0 to a risk-neutral investor who maximizes
JT,h := E[F (T, h)].
There has been a substantial amount of research on the infinite-time horizon ergodic
problem:
max J¯∞ where,
J¯∞ = lim inf
t→∞ −
1
θ
t−1 logE[e−θF (t,h)].
Though these type of problems are interesting in their own right, they are not read-
ily applicable to practical asset management because of non-uniqueness of optimal
controls.
In the past decade, applications of risk-sensitive control to asset manage-
ment have proliferated. Risk-sensitive control was first applied to solve financial
problems by Lefebvre and Montulet [27] in a corporate finance context. Fleming
[14] was the first to show that some investment optimization models could be re-
formulated as risk-sensitive control problems. Bielecki and Pliska [2] considered a
model with n securities and m economic factors with no transaction cost. They
were the first to apply continuous-time risk-sensitive control as a practical tool that
could be used to solve “real-world” portfolio selection problems. They considered
20
a long-term asset allocation problem and proposed the logarithm of the investor’s
wealth as a reward function, so that the investor’s objective is to maximize the
risk-sensitive (log) return of his/her portfolio. They derived the optimal control and
solved the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE under the restrictive
assumption that the securities and economic factors have independent noise. In [3],
Bielecki and Pliska went on to study the economic properties of the risk-sensitive
asset management criterion and then extended the asset management model into an
intertemporal CAPM in [4]. Fleming and Sheu [15] analyzed an investment model
similar to that of Bielecki and Pliska [2]. In their model, however, the factor process
and the security price process were assumed correlated. A major contribution was
made by Kuroda and Nagai [26] who introduced an elegant solution method based
on a change of measure argument which transforms the risk sensitive control prob-
lem into a linear exponential of a quadratic regulator. They solved the associated
HJB PDE over a finite time horizon and then studied the properties of the ergodic
HJB PDE related to J¯∞. Recently, Davis and Lleo [8] applied this change of mea-
sure technique to solve, for both the finite and an infinite horizon, a risk-sensitive
benchmark investment problem (RSBAM) in which an investor selects an asset allo-
cation to outperform a given financial benchmark. In the Kuroda and Nagai set-up
θ represents the sensitivity of an investor to total risk, whereas in the RSBAM, θ
represents the investors sensitivity to active risk i.e. additional risk the investor is
willing to take in order to outperform the benchmark.
It is obvious that for outperforming a stochastic benchmark, an investor will have
to modify his or her optimal trading strategy. Then the question of interest to us is:
“What is the investor’s worst case strategy for an opposing stochastic benchmark”?.
In particular, one can even take the jaundiced point of view that the benchmark
will be set retrospective to the worst case. For example, if a portfolio fund manager
outperforms the set benchmark, the principal may remark this out-performance ei-
ther as best achieved or poorly achieved with respect to the underlying worst-case
scenario. So, in this chapter we consider a game-theoretic version of the problem
within the benchmark framework of Davis and Lleo [8]. In it, we consider a stochas-
tic differential game between two players, namely, the investor (who has a power
utility) and a second player, representing the market, who tries to minimize the
expected payoff of the investor. We explicitly characterize the optimal allocation of
assets and the optimal choice of benchmark index.
In this chapter, we consider the benchmark process ex-ante that evolves ac-
cording to a controlled diffusion process. We contrast this approach to the one of
Heath and Platen [23]. In their methodology, they use the growth optimal portfo-
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lio itself as a benchmark which is closer to the concept of the numeraire portfolio.
Although there has been a long history of applying risk-sensitive optimal control to
problems in finance, a game-theoretic version of such problems in finite horizon is
missing from the literature. We intend to elaborate further on this now.
In the next section we briefly describe the framework of the risk-sensitive
zero sum stochastic differential game corresponding to the desired game (P1)( refer
2.8). In the third section we reformulate the objective criterion under evaluation as
a linear exponential of quadratic regulator problem (P2) (refer 3.11). In the fourth
section we provide a verification lemma that will help us solve this game problem.
In the fifth section we derive the optimal controls and obtain an explicit expression
for the associated value of the game. The chapter as usual concludes with remarks
and pointers to future direction of work.
Broadly speaking our aim is to derive the saddle-point equilibrium pair for
the game (P1). To achieve this, we first obtain saddle point strategy for the game
(P2). We then show that the saddle point equilibrium for (P2) is also saddle point
equilibrium for (P1).
2 Risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game
We consider a market consisting of m + 1 ≥ 2 securities with n ≥ 1 factors. We
assume that the set of securities includes one bond whose price is governed by the
ODE
dS0t = rtS
0
t dt, S
0
0 = s
0, (2.1)
where rt is a deterministic function of t. The other security prices and factors are
assumed to satisfy the following SDE’s
dSit = S
i
t{(a+AXt)idt+
n+m∑
k=1
σikdW
k
t }, Si0 = si, i = 1, ...,m, (2.2)
where the factor process Xt satisfies,
dXt = {(b+BXt)dt+ ΛdWt}, X0 = x ∈ Rn. (2.3)
Here Wt = (Wt)k=1,...,n+m is an n + m dimensional standard Brownian motion de-
fined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,Ft).
The factor process can represent macro-economic indicators such as GDP,
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inflation and market index data. The stock price dynamics are modulated by the
factor process. Hence one can incorporate the effect of macro-economic indicators
into the investment optimization problem by using the stock price process modu-
lated by the factor process Xt.
The model parameters A,B,Λ are respectively m×n, n×n, n× (m+n) con-
stant matrices and a ∈ Rm, b ∈ Rn. The constant matrix (σik){i=1,2....,m;k=1,2,...,(n+m)}
will be denoted by Σ in what follows.
In Kuroda and Nagai [26] it is assumed that the factor process and the stock
price process do not have independent noise i.e. ΣΛ
′ 6= 0. This assumption is in
sharp contrast to Bielecki and Pliska [2] who conversely assume that ΣΛ
′
= 0. We
will assume that ΣΛ
′ 6= 0.
Let Gt = σ(Wu;u ≤ t) be the sigma-field generated by the standard Brow-
nian motions up to time t. For given h ∈ H(T ), the process Vt = V ht represents
the investor’s wealth at time t, under the control h, and satisfies the following SDE
dynamics,
dV ht
V ht
= (rt + h
′
t((a+AXt)− rt1))dt+ h
′
tΣdWt;V
h
0 = v,
which can be rewritten as,
dV ht
V ht
= (rt + h
′
tdt)dt+ h
′
tΣdWt;V
h
0 = v, (2.4)
where dt , a+AXt− rt1. From equation (2.4) it can be seen that if a+AXt = rt1
i.e. dt = 0, then the portfolio wealth process evolves with drift equal to the risk
less interest rate rt. We make an assumption here that the securities price volatility
matrix Σ is a full rank matrix. If it is not full-rank then h
′
Σ = 0 for some h 6= 0.
Hence the market contains redundant asset(s) and the portfolio value process V ht
will grow at a rate different than the risk-less interest rate rt when h
′
d 6= 0 resulting
in an arbitrage. This is the case if the portfolio contains two or more redundant
assets for example a stock and an option on the same stock. Hence we remove
redundancy till the resultant matrix Σ is of full rank thereby ensuring that there
exist no further possibility of arbitrage by trading in the resultant portfolio.
In our benchmark model we express the objective through a new optimization
criterion corresponding to a reward function F which represents the log excess return
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of the asset portfolio over its benchmark and is given as
F (t;h, γ) = log
V ht
Lγt
F (0;h, γ) = log f.
We now formally state the Risk-sensitive Benchmarked Asset management problem
(RSBAM) that we solve.
Problem : Risk-sensitive Benchmarked Asset Management (RS-
BAM)
We first define the objective criterion J as,
J(f, x, h, γ;T ) , −2
θ
logE[exp [
−θ
2
F (T, h, γ)]],
=
−2
θ
logE[
(
V hT
LγT
)−θ/2
],
=
−2
θ
logE[U(
V hT
LγT
)]. (2.5)
where the utility function U(·) is U : x → x− θ2 . The dynamics of the benchmark
process is a diffusion process Lγ modulated by a (Markovian) control γ given by
dLγt
Lγt
= (αt + βtXt)dt+ γ
′
tdWt. (2.6)
where αt ∈ R and β ∈ R1×n. The space of controls Γ(T ) consists of the market
control represented by γ that is Rn+m-valued. Γ(T ) consists of progressively mea-
surable controls measurable w.r.t to {B[0, T ]⊗ Gt}t≥0 and where P (
∫ T
0 |γs|2ds <
∞) = 1 ∀ T <∞ and E[eθ2
∫ T
0 γ
′
sγsds]
1
2
<∞ .
By a simple application of Ito’s formula we have:
dF (t, h, γ) = d log(
V ht
Lγt
)
= {[rt + ht′(a+AXt − rt1)− (αt + βtXt)− 1
2
h
′
tΣΣ
′
ht +
1
2
γ
′
tγt]dt
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)dWt}. (2.7)
We are now in a position to formally state the game-theoretic version of the
game. For a given θ > 0, we consider a stochastic differential game between two
players, namely, the investor (who has a power utility) U and who modulates the
payoff for given γ ∈ Γ(T ) via control h ∈ H(T ). On the other hand the second player,
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say the market, behaves antagonistically to the investor by setting a benchmark
for the investor to outperform by modulating the control γ for a given control h.
This can be conceptualized as a risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game
between the investor on one side and the market on the other and is formalized as
follows
Problem (P1) Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T ) such that,
J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ;T ) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
−2
θ
logE[(
V hT
LγT
)−
θ
2 ] = inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
−2
θ
logE[(
V hT
LγT
)−
θ
2 ].
(2.8a)
This can be construed as a game-theoretic version of the RSBAM problem.
Remark 1:
The problem set up (P1) is an extension of Kuroda and Nagai [26] and Davis and
Lleo [8]. However the former does not consider the benchmarked version i.e. the
benchmark index is identically one in [26] while in Davis and Lleo [8] though have
a benchmarked portfolio criterion, they solve the one player optimization problem
and not the two player saddle point problem.
In light of the mathematical preliminaries just discussed, we formally elabo-
rate the plan to solve the zero sum stochastic differential game (P1).
Step 1 We reformulate the original objective criterion as a power utility function
to an exponential of an integral function.
Step 2 Define a new path functional I(f, x, h, γ, t;T ) (refer equation (3.9)) related
to the exponential of the integral function. Define u¯(t, x) to be the upper-value
function while u(t, x) be the lower-value function for the game associated with I.
Denote the game related to this objective functional as (P2).
Step 3 Deduce the HJBI PDE corresponding to game (P2)( refer (3.11).
Step 4 Formulate the conditions that a candidate value function should satisfy for
the game with regards to objective function I to have a value. This constitutes the
verification lemma.
Step 5 Solve the HJBI PDE derived in step 3 while obtaining the expression for
optimal controls. This optimal control pair will constitute a saddle point equilib-
rium for (P2). The candidate value function satisfying all the conditions of the
verification lemma is our desired value function for (P2).
Step 6 Reverting back to the original problem (P1), show using facts derived in
Step 4, that the game with objective criterion J now has a value as well, and is in
fact u(0, x).
In the next section we reformulate the objective criterion and formalize our
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game problem.
3 Problem Reformulation
Step 1
We will first transform the utility optimization problem (2.5) into optimizing the
exponential-of-integral performance criterion.
Criterion under the expectation
Our first aim is to write the objective criterion J only in terms of the factor process.
Towards that end we define the function g(x, h, γ, r; θ) as follows:
g(x, h, γ, r; θ) =
1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
ΣΣ
′
h− r − h′(a+Ax− r1) + (α+ βx)− 1
2
θ
2
(h
′
Σγ + γ
′
Σ
′
h)
+
1
2
(
θ
2
− 1)γ′γ. (3.1)
From (2.7) and (3.1) we therefore have,
d exp(
−θ
2
F (t;h, γ)) =
θ
2
(
g(Xt, ht, γt, rt; θ)− (h′tΣ− γ
′
t)ΣdWt
)
− θ
2
8
(h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)ΣΣ
′
(Σ
′
ht − γt)dt. (3.2)
Thus we have,
exp(
−θ
2
F (t;h, γ)) = f−θ/2 exp{θ
2
∫ t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, r; θ)ds
− θ
2
∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)dWs −
1
2
(
θ
2
)
2 ∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)
′
ds},
(3.3)
where V h0 = v, L
γ
0 = l and f =
V h0
Lγ0
= vl .
Change of measure
Let Ph,γ be the measure on (Ω,F) defined by,
dPh,γ
dP
|Ft = X¯t, (3.4)
where X¯t is given by
X¯t = E(θ
2
∫
0
(h
′
Σ− γ′)dW )t, (3.5)
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and where E(·) denotes the Doleans-Dade or martingale exponential. From the
assumption made on the space of admissible controls H(T ) and Γ(T ) it is clear that
the Kazamaki condition E[e
∫ t
0 θ
h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s
2
dWs ] < ∞ ∀t ∈ [0, T ] is satisfied so that Ph,γ
to be a probability measure. i.e.
E[E(θ
2
∫
0
(h
′
Σ− γ′)dW )T ] = 1. (3.6)
We note that,
W h,γt ,Wt +
θ
2
∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)ds, (3.7)
by Girsanov’s formula, is a standard Brownian motion under Ph,γ and the factor
process Xt satisfies,
dXt = (b+BXt − θ
2
(Σ
′
ht − γt))′dt+ ΛdW h,γt . (3.8)
Step 2
The HJB equation
Taking expectation w.r.t to the physical measure P and multiplying both sides of
equation (3.3) by −2θ followed by the change of measure argument of (3.4-3.5) one
considers the new path functional I defined as
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) = log f − 2
θ
logEh,γ [exp {θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ)ds}], (3.9)
and then the upper-value function and lower-value function u¯ and u respectively for
the game corresponding to the new path functional I are given by :
u¯(t, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ), (3.10a)
u(t, x) = inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ), (3.10b)
u(t, x) = u¯(t, x) = u(t, x). (3.10c)
If a pair of controls satisfy (3.10c), then the game corresponding to the new path
functional I has the value u and the pair of controls constitutes saddle point strate-
gies for the game with regards to I. Let the exponentially transformed function I˜
be defined as I˜ = exp(− θ2I) and u˜(t, x) := exp(− θ2u(t, x)). We now consider the
problem of determining the saddle-point equilibrium for the game corresponding to
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the new path functional I˜. We call this problem (P2) and it is formally stated as
follows:
Problem P2 Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T ) such that,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T ),
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T ),
= Ehˆ,γˆ [exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hˆs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2]. (3.11)
We now provide a verification lemma for this game. Let us first define the process
Y h,γ(t) by
dY h,γ(t) =
(
dt
dXt
)
=
(
dt
(b+BXt − θ2(h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t))dt+ ΛdW
h,γ
t
)
Let y ,(t, x). The control process h(t) = h(t, ω) and γ(t) = γ(t, ω) for ω ∈ Ω can
be assumed to be Markovian. Let O = (0, T ) × Rn. Then the process Y h,γ(t) is a
Markov process whose generator A˜h,γ acting on a function u˜(t, x) ∈ C20 ([0, T ]×Rn)
is given by,
A˜h,γ u˜(t, x) = ∂u˜(t, x)
∂t
+ (b+Bx− θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h− γ))′Du˜(t, x) + 1
2
tr(ΛΛ∗D2u˜(t, x)).
(3.12)
in which Du˜(t, x) , (∂u˜(t,x)
∂x1
, ..., ∂u˜(t,x)∂xn )
′
and D2u˜(t, x) is the matrix defined by
D2u˜(t, x) , [∂
2u˜(t,x)
∂xixj
], i, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Step 3
By an application of the Feynman-Kac formula, it can be deduced from (3.11)
that the HJBI PDE for u˜(t, x) is given by(
A˜hˆ,γˆ + θ
2
g(x, hˆ, γˆ, r; θ)
)
u˜(t, x) = 0. (3.13)
Reversing the exponential transformation , dividing by −(θ/2)u˜(t, x), we can deduce
from (3.13) that the HJBI PDE for u(t, x) is given for h ∈ Rm and γ ∈ R(m+n) by
Ahˆ,γˆu(t, x) = 0, (3.14)
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where the operator Ah,γ is given by,
Ah,γu(t, x) = ∂u(t, x)
∂t
+ (b+Bx− θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h− γ))′Du(t, x) + 1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x))
− θ
4
(Du(t, x))
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t, x)− g(x, h, γ, r; θ). (3.15)
In the next section we provide a verification lemma for the game based on the cri-
terion function I.
4 Verification lemma for the game PII
Step 4
We now provide a verification lemma related to the game (PII).
Proposition 1. Suppose w˜ ∈ C1,2(O) ∩ C(O¯) (is the space of twice differentiable
functions on O with respect to x, once continuously differentiable on O with respect
to t and which are continuous on O¯ ). Suppose there exists a (Markov) control
h(y), γ(y) that satisfy
1. (A˜h,γˆ(y) + θ2g(x, h, γˆ(y), r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≥ 0 ∀ h ∈ Rm;
2. (A˜hˆ(y),γ + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), γ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≤ 0 ∀ γ ∈ Rm+n;
3. (A˜hˆ(y),γˆ(y) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), γˆ(y), r; θ))[(w˜(y))] = 0 ∀ y ∈ O;
4. (w˜(T,XT )) = f
−θ/2.
Define,
Z˜(s) = Z˜(s)(h, γ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(Xτ , hτ , γτ , rt+τ ; θ)dτ
}
. (4.1)
5. Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0 Dw˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λe
Z˜sdW h,γs ] = 0 ∀ h ∈ Rm, ∀ γ ∈ Rm+n
Now, define for each y ∈ O and h ∈ H(T ) and γ ∈ Γ(T ),
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) = exp(−θ
2
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ))
= Eh,γ [exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2].
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Then (hˆ(y), γˆ(y)) is an optimal (Markov) control i.e.,
w˜(0, x) = u˜(0, x) = I˜(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T ) = inf
h∈H(T )
{ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
[I˜(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
{ inf
h∈H(T )
[I˜(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
I˜(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T )
= inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γˆ, 0, T ) = I˜(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, 0, T ).
Proof Apply Ito’s formula to w˜(s,Xs)e
Z˜s to obtain
d(w˜(t+ s,Xs)e
Z˜s) =
[
eZ˜s(A˜h,γ + θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ))
]
[(w˜(t+ s,Xs))]ds
+ eZ˜s(Dw˜(t+ s,Xs))dW
h,γ
s
w˜(T,XT−t)eZ˜T−t = w˜(t, x) +
∫ T−t
0
((A˜h,γ + θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ))w˜(t+ s,Xs))e
Z˜sds
+
∫ T−t
0
(Dw˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λ)e
Z˜sdWh,γs . (4.2)
From condition(4) of statement of the Proposition 1, we have w˜(T,XT ) = f
−θ/2.
Taking expectation with respect to Ph,γ , setting t = 0 and using conditions (1) and
(5) of the Proposition 1 we get
Eh,Γ[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x)
Since this inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) we have
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,Γ[f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x).
Hence we have,
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,Γ[f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x). (4.3)
Similarly, setting t = 0 we get, using condition (2) of the Proposition 1, we get the
following lower bound,
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Ehˆ,γ [w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x).
Since this inequality is true for all γ ∈ Γ(T ) we have
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Ehˆ,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x).
Hence we have,
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Ehˆ,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x). (4.4)
Also , setting t = 0 and using condition (3) of the Proposition 1 and using the
definition of u˜ in (3.11) we get,
Ehˆ,γˆ [w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] = w˜(0, x)
= Ehˆ,γˆ [exp{θ
2
∫ T
0
g(Xs, hˆs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2]. (4.5)
It is automaticaly true that
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]. (4.6)
Conversely, from (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) we have,
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x) ≤ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]. (4.7)
Hence from (4.6) and (4.7) we have,
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]
= w˜(0, x) = Ehˆ,γˆ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]. (4.8)
This completes the proof.
Corollary 2. Admissible(optimal) strategies for the exponentially transformed prob-
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lem given by (3.11) are also admissible(optimal) for the problem (3.10c). Formally,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
{ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
[I(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]},
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
{ sup
h∈H(T )
[I(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]},
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
I(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T ),
= sup
h∈H(T )
I(f, x, h, γˆ, 0, T ) = I(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, 0, T ).
Proof The value function u and u˜ are related through the strictly monotone con-
tinuous transformation u˜(t, x) = exp(− θ2u(t, x)). Thus admissible (optimal) strate-
gies for the exponentially transformed problem are also admissible(optimal) for the
problem (3.10).
5 Solving the risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differ-
ential game
Step 5
We seek to find the value function u for the game defined in (3.12). We guess
a solution assuming that it belongs to the class C1,2((0, T ) × Rn) and show that
the guess satisfies all the conditions of our verification lemma given by Proposition.
Conditions (1)-(4) of the verification lemma that forms our Proposition 1 can be
written in a compact form as
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
Ah,γu(t, x) = 0; u(T, x) = log f. (5.1)
Motivated by the results in Kuroda and Nagai [26], we will look for a u given by
u(t, x) = 12x
′
Qtx+ q
′
tx+ kt where Q is an n× n symmetric matrix, q ∈ Rn and k is
a scalar. Substituting this form in (3.15) we get
Ah,γu(t, x) = 1
2
x
′ dQt
dt
x+
dqt
dt
′
x+
dkt
dt
+
(
b+Bx− θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
ht − γ(t))
)′
(Qtx+ qt),
+
1
2
(ΛΛ
′
QtQ
′
tΛ
′
Λ)− θ
4
(Qtx+ kt)
′
ΛΛ
′
(Qtx+ kt),
− 1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
tΣΣ
′
ht + rt − (αt + βtx) + h′t(a+Ax− rt1)
+
1
2
θ
2
(h
′
tΣγ + γ
′
Σ
′
ht)− 1
2
(
θ
2
− 1)γ′tγt. (5.2)
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We now solve the first order condition for γˆ to minimize Ahˆ,γu(t, x) over all γ ∈
Rn+m:
(2− θ)γˆt − θ(Σ′ hˆt − γˆ′)Du(t, x) = 0. (5.3)
The first order condition for hˆ that maximizes Ah,γˆ(y)u˜(t, x) over all h ∈ Rm in
terms of u(t, x) is,
hˆt =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[dt +
θ
2
Σγˆt − θ
2
ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x)]. (5.4)
Substituting back hˆ obtained in (5.4) into (5.3) we get
γˆt =
θ
2− θ [Σ
′
hˆt − Λ′Du(t, x)] (5.5)
Comment on the valid range of θ.
Since the game considered is for the risk-averse investor θ > 0. Moreover based in
the expression for γˆ in (5.5), θ 6= 2. This leaves for two possibilities: θ ∈ (0, 2) or
θ ∈ (2,∞). For the optimal strategies (hˆ, γˆ) to be a saddle-point equilibrium for the
game, we would desire that the equation with the quadratic term in h be negative
definite while the quadratic term in γ be positive definite. In fact for the choice
θ > 0, the quadratic term in h desirably is negative definite while for θ < 2, the
quadratic term in γ is positive definite . Hence for our case, the valid range of θ is
between 0 and 2.
The optimal control hˆt is a global maximum while γˆt is a global minimum for
t ≤ [0, T ]. We re-write hˆt and γˆt only in terms of d and u and are given as,
hˆt =
2− θ
2− θ2 (ΣΣ
′
)
−1
dt − θ
2− θ2 (ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x).
γˆt =
θ
2− θ2 Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
dt − θ
2
(2− θ)(2− θ2)Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
Du
− θ
2− θΛ
′
Du.
Based on the above expressions of hˆ· and γˆ·, one can say rather explicitly how
strategies compete vis-a-vis when ΣΛ
′
= 0. In that situation, a quick calculation
follows that the investor invests less and less in the stocks when θ → 1 for the
valid range θ ∈ (0, 1). On the contrary investor’s allocation in the risky stocks
increases for the valid range θ ∈ (−2, 0) − {−√2} as θ gets more negative. From
the perspective of risk-sensitive optimization, this is expected. Likewise we have the
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following relation between the volatility coefficient of the portfolio wealth process
and the benchmark process namely Σ
′
hˆ and γˆ respectively which is
Σhˆt =
2− θ
θ
γˆt.
For −2 < θ < 1, volatility of the portfolio wealth process is higher than the bench-
mark process in magnitude. Contrary effect is seen for 1 < θ < 2.
We substitute hˆ from (5.4) and γˆ from (5.5) in (5.1) to obtain
Ahˆ,γˆu(t, x) = 0; u(T, x) = log f (5.6)
We then group all the resulting quadratic terms in x, linear terms in x and constants
together to conclude that the choice of u(t, x) = 12x
′
Qtx + q
′
tx + kt is indeed the
solution to the HJBI PDE (5.1) provided that Q, q and k satisfy the following system
of differential equations:
• a matrix Ricatti equation related to the coefficient of the quadratic term and used
to determine the symmetric non-negative matrix Qt, given as
dQt
dt
= QtK0Qt +K
′
1Qt +QtK1 + 2
2− θ
(2− θ2)2A
′
(ΣΣ−1)−1A = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
QT = 0 (5.7)
where
K0 =
−θ2
2(2−θ)ΛΛ
′
+ 2θ
2
(2−θ)(2−θ2)2 ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
K1 = B − 2θ(2−θ2)2A
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
• The following linear ordinary differential equation satisfied by the n element
column vector q(t)
dqt
dt
+ (K
′
1 +QtK0)qt +Q
′
tb+ (a− rt1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
[
−2θ
(2− θ2)2 ΣΛ
′
Q(t) +
(2− θ)
(2− θ2)2A]
− βt = 0
qT = 0 (5.8)
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• The following linear ordinary differential equation satisfied by the constant kt
dkt
dt
+
1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
Qt) + rt − αt − 2θ
(2− θ2)2 (a− rt1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
q(t)
+
2− θ
(2− θ2)2 (a− rt1)
−1(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
(a− rt1)
+
θ2
(2− θ)(2− θ2)2 q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
q(t)
− θ
2
4(2− θ)q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t) = 0
kT = log f (5.9)
Condition 4 of Proposition 1 in terms of u imposes the terminal condition in
(5.9).
If K0 is positive definite then a unique solution to the Riccati equation (5.7),
Qt , exists for all t ≤ T . This property of positive definiteness follows from interpre-
tation of the solution Qt as the covariance matrix of observations from a Kalman
filter used to estimate the state of a dynamical system (see Theorem 4.4.1 in Davis
[7]) for details. The uniqueness property of Qt follows from the standard existence-
uniqueness theorem for first order differential equations (see Proposition 4.4.2 in
Davis [7]).
It remains to be seen if u˜ = exp(− θ2u) for the choice of u satisfies condition (5) of
the Proposition .
Lemma 3. Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0 e
Z˜s(Du˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λ)dW
h,γ
s ] = 0.
Proof From the definition of u˜ in (3.11), for any optimal control belonging to
Γ(T ), the strategy hˆ ≡ 0 is sub-optimal, and hence will provide an upper bound on
u˜. Further for the zero-benchmark case namely, γˆ ≡ 0, we would obtain now an
upper bound on u˜
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γˆ [exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2],
≤ E0,γˆ [exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, 0, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2],
∴ u˜(t, x) ≤ E0,0[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, 0, 0, rs+t; θ)ds}f−θ/2],
= exp(−θ
2
∫ T−t
0
rs+tds)f
−θ/2.
Now Q and q are solutions to the system of o.d.e, and hence are integrals of bounded
functions . Hence Q and q are continuous functions of time t ∈ [0, T ] and hence
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bounded on [0, T ]. The matrix Λ is a known constant. From standard existence-
uniqueness result of stochastic differential equation (refer Oksendal ([30])) we have
X ∈ L2(Ω,F ,Ph,γ). Hence from the upper bound on u˜ and the fact that Du(t,Xt) =
QtXt + qt is in L
2(Ω,F ,Ph,γ), we have that Eh,γ([Du˜ ΛeZ , Du˜ ΛeZ ]t) < ∞ ∀t ∈
[0, T ]. Hence we have Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0 Du˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λe
Z˜sdW h,γs ] = 0. .
It is clear that our guess for u˜ = exp(− θ2u) satisfies conditions (1)-(5) of Proposition
1. Hence our choice of u˜ indeed is the value of the game (P2) and controls hˆ, γˆ are
the saddle point equilibrium of this game.
Corollary 4. For the choice of space of controls H(T ) and Γ(T ), we have
E[E
(
− θ
2
∫
0
[(QtXt + qt)Λ + (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]dWt
)
T
] = 1. (5.10)
Proof: From the Kazamaki condition, refer (Oksendal [30]), (5.10) holds if
E[exp(
∫ t
0 θ(
(QsXs+qs)Λ+(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)
2 )dWs)] < ∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence by application of
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have,
E[exp(
∫ t
0
θ(
(QsXs + qs)Λ + (h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)
2
)dWs)],
≤ (E[e
∫ t
0 θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ])1/2(E[e
∫ t
0 θ(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)dWs ])
1/2
.
However for E[e
∫ t
0 θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ] < ∞ to hold , it is enough to show that the
Novikov condition given by E[e
∫ T
0 θ
2(QsXs+qs)ΛΛ
′
(QsXs+qs)ds] < ∞ hold; refer (Ok-
sendal [30]). Since X is Gaussian process and Qt and qt are deterministic, (QtXt +
qt)Λ is Gaussian and hence by completion of squares argument detailed in Theorem 4
below we have E[e
∫ T
0 θ
2(QsXs+qs)ΛΛ
′
(QsXs+qs)ds] <∞ holds and hence E[e
∫ t
0 θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ] <
∞ ∀t ∈ [0, T ] is validated. (E[e
∫ t
0 θ(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)dWs ])
1/2
< ∞ is validated from similar
application of Cauchy-Schwartz inequality followed by the assumption made earlier
in the definition of the space of controls H(T ) and Γ(T ). Thus the Kazamaki con-
dition holds and the conclusion follows.
Theorem 5. If there exist a solution Q to (5.7), then the strategies (hˆ, γˆ) defined
by
hˆt =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[dt +
θ
2
Σγt − θ
2
ΣΛ
′
(QtXt + qt)]. (5.11)
γˆt =
θ
2− θ [Σ
′
hˆt − Λ′(QtXt + qt)], (5.12)
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where q is a solution of (5.8) are admissible i.e. h ∈ H(T ) and γ ∈ Γ(T ) and are
optimal for the finite horizon game problem (P1), namely,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ; θ),
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ; θ),
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ; θ),
= sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γˆ, T ; θ),
= J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, T ; θ),
=
1
2
x
′
Q0x+ q
′
0x+ k0.
Proof The controls derived in section 5, (hˆ, γˆ) forms the saddle point equilibrium
for the (P2) game . We aim to show that these controls are in fact admissible and
optimal for the problem (P1) as well.
Proof of admissibility From the expression for hˆ and γˆ in (5.4) and (5.5) respectively
we note that − θ2
(
(QtXt+qt)Λ+(hˆ
′
tΣ−γˆ
′
t)
)
can be written linearly in Xt as X
′
tv
1
t +v
2
t
where, constants v1t and v
2
t are given by,
v1t = −
θ
2
Q
′
(t)Λ +
θ(θ − 1)
(2− θ2)A
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
+
θ(θ − 1)
2− θ2 Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r1)
− 2θ
2(θ − 1)
(2− θ)(2− θ2)Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)− θ
2
(2− θ)Q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t).
v2t = −
θ
2
q
′
(t)Λ +
θ(θ − 1)
(2− θ2) (a− r1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)
− θ
2(θ − 1)
(2− θ)(2− θ2)q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)− θ
2
(2− θ)q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t)
Since X satisfies the SDE , dXt = (b + BXt)dt + ΛdWt, soE|Xt| ≤ E|X(0)| +
|b|T + |B| ∫ t0 E|Xs|ds. By Gronwall’s inequality, therefore E|Xt| ≤ (E|X(0)| +
|b|T ) exp(|B|t) and Cov(Xt) = Λ′Λt. Let φ(t) , v1tXt + v2t . We now explicitly
calculate E[eδ|φt|2 ] for some δ > 0 since from Remark 2 in Lemma 2, of section
12 (Gihman and Skorokhod [22]) would imply that the Novikov’s condition holds
true. Let Rt = e
−BtXt + e−bt. Hence dRt = e−BtΛdWt. Therefore Rt is a Gaus-
sian process and hence φt is Gaussian process with drift. Also µt = E[|φt|] ≤
sup0≤t≤T |v1t |(E|X0|+ |b|T ) exp(|B|t)+sup0≤t≤T |v2t | and Σ˜t = Cov(φt) ≤ v1
′
tΛ
′
Λv1t .
Thus mean µt and co-variance Σ˜t are bounded above by t. We use the following com-
pletion of squares argument: 12z
′
Az+b
′
z+c = 12(z+A
−1b)′A(z+A−1b)+c− 12b
′
A−1b
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.E[eδ|φt|
2
] =
∫
Rn
1
2pin/2|Σ˜tΣ˜′t|1/2
eδ|φ|
2
t e−
1
2
(φ−µt)′ (Σ˜tΣ˜′t)−1(φ−µt)dx1dx2...dxn ,
=
1
2pin/2|Σ˜tΣ˜′t|1/2
∫
Rn
e
−φ′ (−2δI+(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)
−1
φ+2µ
′
(t)(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1φ−µ′t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt
2 dx1....dxn,
=
|(Σ˜′tΣ˜t)|−1/2
|(−2δI + (Σ˜tΣ˜′t)−1)−1|
−1/2×,
e
−µ′t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt+4µ
′
t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1(−2δI+(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)
−1
(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt
2 .
Matrix (Σ˜tΣ˜t)
−1
is symmetric positive definite with lowest eigenvalue say λmin.
Then it is easy to show that for δ < λmin2 , matrix (−2δI + (Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)−1 is positive
definite . Along with the derived fact that µt and Σ˜t is bounded above by t ≤ T
, hence there exists some constant C such that E[eδ|φt|2 ] ≤ C. Hence the optimal
controls hˆ, γ belong to their respective admissible class viz. H(T ) and Γ(T ) respec-
tively.
Proof of optimality Define,
Zs = Zs(h, γ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(Xτ , hτ , γτ , rt+τ ; θ)dτ − (h′τΣ− γ
′
τ )dWτ ,
− θ
4
(h
′
τΣ− γ
′
τ )
′
(h
′
τΣ− γ
′
τ )dτ
}
. (5.13)
Also define, χ(t, x) = − θ2(u(t, x) − log f) and Lu(t, x) = 12 tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x)) + (b +
Bx)
′
Du(t, x)
Hence, we have
dχ(t+ s,Xs) = −θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
+ Lu)(t+ s,Xs)ds− θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs.
Hence,
d exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)}
exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)} = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,Xs)− θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,Xs)ds.
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and so,
d exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)} exp{Z(s)}
exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)} exp{Z(s)} = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,Xs)− θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs,
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,Xs)ds+
θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs + t; θ)ds,
− θ
2
(h
′
(s)Σ− γ′(s))dWs + θ
2
4
(h
′
(s)Σ− γ′(s))Λ′Du(t+ s,Xs)ds.
Hence from (3.15), we have,
exp{χ(T,X(T − t)) + Z(T − t)} = exp(χ(t, x)) exp
[ ∫ T−t
0
−θ
2
(Ah,γu(t+ s,Xs))ds,
−
∫ T−t
0
θ
2
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]dWt,
−
∫ T−t
0
θ2
8
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)][Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]
′
ds
]
. (5.14)
We have shown that u satisfies conditions (1)-(5) of Proposition 1. Hence from con-
dition(4) of the Proposition 1, we have χ(T, x) = 0. Now setting t = 0 and taking
condition (1) of the Proposition 1 into account for γ = γˆ, and for any h ∈ Hˆ(T ) we
see from (5.14) that
(
V hT
LΓT
)
−θ/2
≥ e− θ2u(0,x) exp
[
−
∫ T
0
θ
2
[Du(s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
sΣ− Γ
′
s)]dWs
−
∫ T
0
θ2
8
[Du(s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)][Du(s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
sΣ− Γ
′
s)]
′
ds
]
.
Now by taking expectations w.r.t to the physical probability measure P on both
sides of above equation and using corollary , we obtain
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x).
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) so we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x).
Hence we have,
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x). (5.15)
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Likewise, setting t = 0 and taking condition (2) of the Proposition 1 into account
for h = hˆ, and for any γ ∈ Γ(T ) we see that
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x).
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) so:
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x).
Hence we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≥ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x). (5.16)
Hence from (5.15) and (5.16) we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x) ≥ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ). (5.17)
Moreover, setting t = 0 and taking condition (3) of the Proposition 1 into account
for h = hˆ, γ = γˆ (such that hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T )) we see that
J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, T ) = u(0, x). (5.18)
It is always true that
sup
h∈H(T )
( inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T )) ≤ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
( sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T )). (5.19)
Hence combining (5.17) and (5.19) we deduce the final conclusion that the game
(P1) has a value and is u(0, x).
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we provide a two player zero sum stochastic differential game in the
context of the risk-sensitive benchmark asset management problem. We obtain an
explicit expression for the optimal strategies for both the players. Future work could
be directed towards considering a game theoretic benchmark problem with infinite
horizon risk sensitive criterion.
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Chapter 3
On the role of the
Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal
martingale measure in risk
sensitive control asset
management.
Abstract
Kuroda and Nagai [26] state that the factor process in the Risk Sensitive control
Asset Management (RSCAM) is stable under the Fo¨llmer and Schweizer minimal
martingale measure (MMM) . Fleming and Sheu [15] and more recently Fo¨llmer
and Schweizer [18] have observed that the role of the minimal martingale measure
in this portfolio optimization is yet to be established. In this note we aim to address
this question by explicitly connecting the optimal wealth allocation to the minimal
martingale measure. We achieve this by using a “trick” of setting this problem in
the context of model uncertainty via a two-person, zero-sum, stochastic differential
game between the investor and an antagonistic market that provides a probability
measure. We obtain some startling insights. Firstly, if short-selling is not permit-
ted and if the factor process evolves under the minimal martingale measure then
the investor’s optimal strategy can only be to invest in the riskless asset (i.e. the
no-regret strategy). Secondly, if the factor process and the stock price process have
independent noise, then even if the market allows short selling, the optimal strategy
for the investor must be the no-regret strategy while the factor process will evolve
under the minimal martingale measure.
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1 Introduction
Risk sensitive control Asset Management (RSCAM) balances the investors
interest in maximizing the expected growth rate of wealth against his aversion to
risk due to deviations of the actually realized rate from the expectation for a finite
time horizon. The subjective notion of investor’s risk aversion is parameterized
by a single variable, say θ. In RSCAM we consider the following criterion to be
maximized. For a given θ > −2, θ 6= 0 and for time horizon T < ∞, with wealth
allocation control denoted by h(t), the risk-sensitive expected growth rate up to
time horizon T criterion J(v, h, T ; θ) defined by,
J(v, h, T ; θ) , −2
θ
logE[exp [
−θ
2
log V h(T )]], (1.1)
where V h(T ) is time-T portfolio value. An asymptotic expansion around θ = 0 for
the above criterion yields
J(v, h, T ; θ) = E[V h(T )]− θ
2
V ar(V h(T )) +O(θ2); V h(0) = v.
As is obvious from the preceding equation, θ > 0 corresponds to a risk-averse in-
vestor, θ < 0 to a risk seeking investor and θ = 0 to a risk-neutral investor. Hence
the optimal expected utility function depends on θ and is a generalization of the
traditional stochastic control in the sense that now the degree of risk aversion of
the investor is explicitly parameterized through θ rather than importing it in the
problem via an externally defined utility function. For this reason investment op-
timization models have been popularly reformulated as risk-sensitive control prob-
lems. For a general reference on risk-sensitive control, refer Whittle [33].
Risk-sensitive control was first applied to solve financial problems by Lefebvre
and Montulet [27] in a corporate finance context and by Fleming [14] in a portfolio
selection context. A RSCAM problem with m securities and n (economic) factors
was introduced by Bielecki and Pliska [2]. Their factor model however made a rather
strong assumption that the factor process and the securities price process in their
financial optimization model had independent noise. A generalization to this model,
relaxing this assumption was made by Kuroda and Nagai [26], who introduced an
elegant solution method based on a change of measure argument which transforms
the risk sensitive control problem into a linear exponential of a quadratic regulator.
They solved the associated HJB PDE over a finite time horizon and then studied
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the properties of the ergodic HJB PDE. We go about formally stating the problem
by first describing the factor model for a risk averse investor.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be the filtered probability space. Consider a market of
m+1 ≥ 2 securities and n ≥ 1 factors. We assume that the set of securities includes
one bond whose price is governed by the ODE
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, S0(0) = s0, (1.2)
where r(t) is a deterministic function of t. The other security prices are assumed to
satisfy the following SDE’s,
dSi(t) = Si(t){(a+AX(t))idt+
n+m∑
k=1
σikdW
k(t)}, Si(0) = si, i = 1, ...,m., (1.3)
where the component-wise factor process satisfies,
dXi(t) = (b+BX(t))idt+
n+m∑
k=1
λikdW
k(t), Xi(0) = xi, i = 1, ..., n.
X(t) = (X1(t), ..., Xn(t))
′
(where the symbol ′ signifies transpose) satisfies the fol-
lowing dynamics,
dX(t) = (b+BX(t))dt+ ΛdW (t), X(0) = x ∈ Rn. (1.4)
Here, W (t) = (W k(t))k=1,...,n+m is an n + m dimensional standard Brownian mo-
tion defined on the filtered probability space. The model parameters A,B are re-
spectively m × n, n × n, n × (m + n) constant matrices and a ∈ Rm , b ∈ Rn.
The constant matrix [σik] , Σ, i = 1, 2....,m; k = 1, 2, ..., (n + m). Similarly,
[λik] , Λ, i = 1, 2...., n; k = 1, 2, ..., (n + m). We denote the transpose of l by l
′
.
Likewise let |v| be a suitable vector norm for any vector v and let ||M || symbolize
a suitable matrix norm for any matrix M . As discussed earlier, as part of gen-
eralizing the Bielecki and Pliska factor model [2], Kuroda and Nagai [26] assume
that the factor process and the securities price process are correlated i.e. ΣΛ
′ 6= 0.
The investment strategy which represents proportional allocation of total wealth
in the ith security Si(t) is denoted by hi(t) for i = 0, 1, ...,m and we set, S(t) :=
(S1(t), S2(t), ..., Sm(t))
′
, h(t) := (h1(t), ..., hm(t))
′
and let Gt = σ(W (u);u ≤ t) be
the filtration generated by the standard Brownian motions that drives the stock
price process and the factor process. Let H(T ) be a space of Rm valued controls for
the investor meaning we say that h(t) ∈ H(T ) where h(t) is Gt-progressively measur-
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able stochastic processes such that
∑m
i=1 h
i(t) +h0(t) = 1, P (
∫ T
0 |h(t)|2dt <∞) = 1
and E[e
θ2
2
∫ T
0 h
′
tΣΣ
′
htdt] < ∞. For given h(t) ∈ H(T ) the process V (t) = V h(t) is
determined by the SDE,
dV h(t)
V h(t)
= h0(t)r(t)dt+
m∑
i=1
hi(t){(a+AX(t))idt+
m+n∑
k=1
σikdW
k(t)}; V h(0) = v.
which can be written as,
dV h(t)
V h(t)
= (r(t) + h
′
(t)δ(t))dt+ h
′
(t)ΣdW (t); V h(0) = v. (1.5)
where δ(t) , a+AX(t)−r(t)1. From the expression of security/stock price dynam-
ics S(t) (1.3), it is obvious that the market is incomplete (as it has m securities and
n+m Brownian drivers) and hence there exist many equivalent martingale measures
or EMM’s. We refer the reader to Karatzas and Shreve [25] for a general treatment
on market incompleteness. One such candidate equivalent martingale measure is
the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale measure. For the continuous adapted
stock price process S = (S(t))0≤t≤T , the minimal martingale measure P∗ (say) is
the unique equivalent local martingale measure with the property that the local
P-martingale parts of S are also local P∗-martingales. For the Fo¨llmer-Schweizer
minimal martingale measure P∗, the density process is given by the following dy-
namics,
dP∗
dP
= E(−
∫
0
((Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1) δ)
′
dW )T . (1.6)
Kuroda and Nagai [26] observe that the condition of stability of the matrix
B − ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1A induces stability on the factor process X = (X(t))0≤t≤T under
the minimal martingale measure. Fleming and Sheu [15] and more recently Fo¨llmer
and Schweizer [18] have observed that this observation and more significantly the
role of the minimal martingale measure in this portfolio asset management prob-
lem is yet to be established. In this chapter we address these questions. We do so
by conceptualizing the RSCAM as a zero-sum, stochastic differential game between
(a market) that provides a probability measure that works antagonistically against
another player (the investor) who otherwise wants to maximize the risk-sensitive
criterion. We call this game (GI)(refer (2.4)). We need to determine the controls
that forms the saddle point equilibrium to this game. This will then illuminate the
explicit dependence between controls h(t) and the probability measure which would
44
then lead us to connect the role played by the minimal martingale measure. We
achieve this objective through the following road map:
Key Steps
Step 1: We re-formulate the game (GI) into an auxiliary game characterized by
the exponential of integral criterion that involves just the factor process X. We call
this game (GII)(refer equation (2.11)).
Step 2: We then provide a verification lemma for (GII).
Step 3: We then obtain the optimal controls and deduce the connection between
the minimal martingale measure and investor’s optimal strategy.
Step 4: To complete the analysis we end by showing that the controls hence ob-
tained while solving game (GII) in Step 3 in fact also constitute a saddle-point
equilibrium strategy for the original game (GI).
2 Worst-Case risk sensitive zero-sum stochastic differ-
ential game
As discussed in the introduction, the Kuroda and Nagai investment market model is
incomplete. We are interested in understanding the influence the minimal martin-
gale measure has on this portfolio optimization problem. We conjure an approach,
whereby we can explicitly characterize the dependence between the minimal mar-
tingale measure and the control variable h. Formally the way we do this is to define
a “market world”. The market world is a space of probability measures defined as
P , {Pη,ξ : (η, ξ) = (η(t), ξ(t))T≥t≥0 ∈ O(T )},
on (Ω,F), where O(T ) denotes the set of deterministic controls η(t) ∈ Rn×(n+m)
and ξ(t) ∈ R1×(n+m) which are continuous over the compact set [0, T ] and hence
bounded. E(·) is the Dolea´ns-Dade exponential. For (η(t), ξ(t)) ∈ O(T ), for fixed
time horizon T , the restriction of Pη,ξ to the σ− field FT is given by the Radon-
Nikodym density
Dη,ξ(T ) , dP
η,ξ
dP
|FT , E
(∫
0
(η(t)
′
X(t) + ξ
′
(t))
′
dW (t)
)
T
. (2.1)
with respect to the reference measure P. We now show that for (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ), Pη,ξ
is a probability measure.
Lemma 1. E[Dη,ξ(T )] = 1 for all (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ).
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Proof The process X(t) in (1.4) is a Gaussian process. From (1.4) and Gronwall’s
inequality we have E|X(t)| ≤ (E|X(0)| + |b|T ) exp(||B||t) and Cov(X(t)) = Λ′Λt
where Cov is the covariance function. As η(t), ξ(t) are deterministic controls and
are bounded, φ(t) , X ′(t)η(t) + ξ(t) is also a Gaussian process with bounded mean
and covariance on a finite time interval [0, T ]. Hence by an application of Novikov’s
condition, the Dolea´ns-Dade exponential in (2.1) is a P- martingale. A standard
proof of this fact can be seen in Lemma 3.1.1 in Bensoussan [1].
We now re-evaluate the optimization criterion J under the new probability measure
Pη,ξ and call it J˜ which is defined as
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) =
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]].
where the portfolio value under the new probability measure Pη,ξ is given by
dV h,η,ξ(t)
V h,η,ξ(t)
=
[
r(t) + h
′
(t)(δ(t)− Σ(η′(t)X(t) + ξ′(t)))
]
dt+ h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t),
V h,η,ξ(0) = v. (2.2)
From Lemma 1 we have that Pη,ξ is a probability measure for (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ).
From the standard result in Girsanov [21], under the probability measure Pη,ξ,
W η,ξ(t) ,W (t) +
∫ t
0
(η
′
(s)X(s) + ξ
′
(s))ds,
is a standard Brownian motion process and therefore the factor process X(t), satis-
fies the following SDE
dX(t) = (b+BX(t)− Λ(η′(t)X(t) + ξ′(t)))dt+ ΛdW η,ξ(t), (2.3)
Remark 1 From equations (1.6) and (2.1) , it is clear that Pη,ξ is a minimal martin-
gale measure for ηˆ(t) , η(t) = A′(ΣΣ′)−1Σ and ξˆ(t) , ξ(t) = (a− r(t)1)′(ΣΣ′)−1Σ.
Kuroda and Nagai [26] have stated that under the condition of stability of
the matrix B − ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1A, the factor process X(t) is stable under the minimal
martingale measure. In light of our Remark 1, we validate this statement now.
Remark 2 As η(t) = ηˆ(t) and ξ(t) = ξˆ(t) corresponds to the minimal martin-
gale measure, the dynamics of X(t) under the minimal martingale measure can be
re-written as
dX(t) =
(
b− ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1(a− r(t)1) + (B − ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1A)X(t)
)
dt+ ΛdW ηˆ,ξˆ(t).
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We are interested in finding the behavior of the solution X(t) as t→∞. The coeffi-
cient of the X(t) term in the drift part of the above equation is B −ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1A.
Since, by assumption, this coefficient term is a stable matrix, X(t) is hence stable
under the minimal martingale measure.
We need to now pin down the influence the minimal martingale measure
has on this portfolio optimization problem to further resolve the inquiry posed by
Fleming and Sheu [15].
To do so, as stated earlier, we conceptualize this problem as a game between a player
termed as the market against the investor. We denote this game as (GI).
Game GI Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that,
J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ; θ) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]],
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
−2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]]. (2.4)
Our intention is to re-write the objective function J˜ purely in terms of the factor
process X. We set to achieve this by defining,
g(x, h, η, ξ, r; θ) , 1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
ΣΣ
′
h− r − h′
(
δ − Σ(η′x+ ξ′)
)
.
(2.5)
From (2.5), we have
−θ
2
dlog V h,η,ξ(t) =
(
θ
2
g(X(t), h(t), η(t), ξ(t), r(t); θ)− θ
2
8
h
′
(t)ΣΣ
′
h(t)
)
dt
− θ
2
h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t). (2.6)
We next define the following stochastic exponential and measure:
dPh,η,ξ
dPη,ξ
|FT = E(−
θ
2
∫
0
h
′
(t)ΣdW η,ξ(t))T . (2.7)
From the definition of the class of controls H(T ), it is clear from an application of
Novikov’s condition that Ph,η,ξ is a probability measure. Under Ph,η,ξ, the standard
result of Girsanov [21] yields that
W h,η,ξ(t) ,W η,ξ(t) +
∫ t
0
θ
2
Σ
′
h(s)ds,
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is a standard Ph,η,ξ- Brownian motion and the factor process X(t) satisfies the
following dynamics
dX(t) = (b+BX(t)− Λ(η′(t)X(t) + ξ′(t))− θ
2
ΛΣ
′
h(t))dt+ ΛdW h,η,ξ(t). (2.8)
Now, under the new probability measure Ph,η,ξ, and using (2.4)-(2.6) and (2.8) we
define an auxiliary optimization criterion I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ) given as
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ) = log v − 2
θ
logEh,η,ξ
[
exp
(
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds
)]
.
(2.9)
This will lead us to frame the auxiliary game GII that constitutes our first step in
the road map in the Introduction.
Step 1:
In a worst-case risk-sensitive asset management scenario, the investor chooses a
portfolio process h so as to maximize the expected exponential-of-integral perfor-
mance index I. Then the response of the market to this choice is to select (η, ξ) (and
hence a probability measure)that minimizes the maximum expected exponential-of-
integral performance index. Formally,
The upper value of this game is given by
u¯(t, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ),
while the lower value of the game is given by
u(t, x) = inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ; θ),
The game has a value provided,
u¯(t, x) = u(t, x) = u(t, x) = I(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, t, T ; θ). (2.10)
and hence hˆ, (ηˆ, ξˆ) is a saddle-point equilibrium. We aim to provide a verifica-
tion lemma for which (2.10) is satisfied. In that spirit, consider the exponentially
transformed criterion which is simply obtained via the transformation u˜(t, x) =
exp(− θ2u(t, x)). This transformation defines what we call game GII.
Game (GII)
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Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= Ehˆ,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), hˆ(s), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2]. (2.11)
We now deduce the values of (hˆ, (ηˆ, ξˆ)) for game (GII).
3 An HJBI equation for game GII.
Step 2:
Let us now define a couplet process Y h,(η,ξ)(t) as
dY h,(η,ξ)(s) =
(
dY0(s)
dY1(s)
)
=
(
ds
dX(s)
)
=
(
ds
(b+BX(s)− Λ(η′(s)X(s) + ξ′(s))− θ2ΛΣ
′
h(s))dt+ ΛdW h,η,ξ(s)
)
Y0(0) = s ∈ [0, T ], Y1(0) = y = (y1, ...yn). The control process h(s) = h(s, ω) is
assumed to be Markovian. Then the process Y h,(η,ξ)(s) is a Markov process whose
generator acting on a function u˜(y) ∈ C1,20 ((0, T ) × Rn) where (C1,20 is the space
of functions with compact support on (0, T )× Rn such that it is once continuously
differentiable in time and twice continuously differentiable in space variable x) is
given by,
A˜h,(η,ξ)u˜(y) = ∂u˜(y)
∂s
+ (b+Bx− Λ(η′x+ ξ′)− θ
2
ΛΣ
′
h)
′
Du˜(y) +
1
2
tr(ΛΛ∗D2u˜(y)).
(3.1)
in which Du˜(y) , (∂u˜(y)
∂y11
, ..., ∂u˜(y)∂yn1
)
′
and D2u˜(y) is the matrix defined as D2u˜(y) ,
[ ∂
2u˜(y)
∂yi1∂y
j
1
], i, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
By an application of the Feynman-Kac formula, it can be deduced that the
HJB PDE for u˜(y) is given by(
A˜hˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ) + θ
2
g(x, hˆ(y), ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ)
)
u˜(y) = 0.
(3.2)
The following proposition presents a diagnostic to identify a solution to the game
(GII).
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Proposition 2. Define S = (0, T )×Rn. Let there exist a function w˜ ∈ C1,2(S)∩C(S¯)
and a (Markov) control hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) such that for each y ∈ S satisfy,
1. (A˜h,(ηˆ,ξˆ) + θ2g(x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≥ 0 ∀ h ∈ Rm;
2. (A˜hˆ(y),(η,ξ) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), η, ξ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≤ 0 ∀ η ∈ Rn×(n+m), ξ ∈ R1×(n+m);
3. (A˜hˆ(y),(ηˆ,ξˆ) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), ηˆ, ξˆ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] = 0;
4. [(w˜(T,XT ))] = v
−θ/2.
5. Eh,η,ξ[
∫ T−t
0 Dw˜
′
(t+ s,X(s))ΛeZ˜sdW h,η,ξs ] = 0 ∀ h ∈ Rm,∀ η ∈ Rn×(n+m), ξ ∈
R1×(n+m);
where,
Z˜(s) = Z˜s(h, η, ξ) :=
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(X(τ), h(τ), η(τ), ξ(τ), r(t+ τ); θ)dτ
}
. (3.3)
Define ,
I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T ) = exp(−θ
2
I(v, x, h, η, ξ, t, T )),
= Eh,η,ξ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), η(s), ξ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2].
Then,
u˜(0, x) = w˜(0, x) = I˜(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ) = inf
h∈H(T )
{ sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
[I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T )]},
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{ inf
h∈H(T )
[I˜(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T )]},
= sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I˜(v, x, hˆ, (η, ξ), 0, T ),
= inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(v, x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ) = I˜(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ).
and (hˆ, (ηˆ, ξˆ)) is a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof Apply Ito’s formula to w˜(s,X(s))eZ˜(s) to obtain
w˜(T,X(T − t))eZ˜(T−t) = w˜(t, x),
+
∫ T−t
0
((A˜h,η,ξ + θ
2
g(X(s), h(X(s)), η(s), ξ(s), r(s+ t); θ))w˜(t+ s,X(s)))eZ˜s)ds,
+
∫ T−t
0
(Dw˜
′
(t+ s,X(s))Λ)eZ˜(s)dW h,η,ξ(s).
(3.4)
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Taking expectation with respect to Ph,η,ξ , from condition (5) of the Proposition 2
, the stochastic integral in (3.4) vanishes. Now setting t = 0 and further applying
condition (1) and (4) of the proposition 2 again , we get
Eh,η,ξ[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x).
Since this inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) we have
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x).
Hence we have,
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x). (3.5)
Similarly, setting t = 0 and using conditions (5), (2) and (4) of the proposition 2,
we get the following upper value of the game:
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ sup
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
Eh,η,ξ[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x).
(3.6)
Also , setting t = 0 and using conditions (5), (3) and (4) of the proposition 2 we
get:
Ehˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ)[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] = w˜(0, x)
= Ehˆ,(ηˆ,ξˆ)[exp{θ
2
∫ T
0
g(X(s), hˆ(X(s)), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s); θ)ds}v−θ/2].
(3.7)
From (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), and the fact that
sup(η,ξ)∈O(T ) infh∈H(T )[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ infh∈H(T ) sup(η,ξ)∈O(T )[v−θ/2eZ˜T ] automatically
holds, the conclusion now follows.
We now return to the game problem involving u as the payoff function.
Corollary 3. u(0, x) = u¯(0, x) = u(0, x).
Proof The value functions u and u˜ are related through the strictly monotone con-
tinuous transformation u˜(t, x) = exp(− θ2u(t, x)). Thus admissible (optimal) strate-
gies for the exponentially transformed problem u˜ obtained via Proposition 2 are also
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admissible(optimal) for the problem u. In other words,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{[I(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T )]},
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
{ sup
h∈H(T )
[I(v, x, h, η, ξ, 0, T )]},
= inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
I(v, x, hˆ, η, ξ, 0, T ),
= sup
h∈H(T )
I(v, x, h, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ) = I(v, x, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, 0, T ).
Hence u(0, x) = u¯(0, x) = u(0, x).
4 Solving game GII.
Step 3 :
We seek to find a function u that would satisfy all the conditions of our
verification lemma given by Proposition 2. Conditions (1)-(4) of the verification
lemma can be written in a compact form in terms of u(t, x) as
Ahˆ,ηˆ,ξˆu(t, x) = 0,
u(T, x) = log v. (4.1)
where the operator Ah,η,ξu(t, x) for any h ∈ Rm and η ∈ Rn×(n+m), ξ ∈ R1×(n+m)
is given by,
Ah,η,ξu(t, x) = ∂u(t, x)
∂t
+ (b+Bx− Λ(η′(s)X(s) + ξ′(s)))− θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h))
′
Du(t, x)
+
1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x))
− θ
4
(Du(t, x))
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t, x)− g(x, h, η, ξ, r; θ). (4.2)
The first order condition for hˆ that maximizes Ah,ηˆ,ξˆ over all H(T ) is given by,
hˆ(t) =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[δ(t)− Σ(ηˆ′(t)X(t) + ξˆ′)− θ
2
ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x)]. (4.3)
Substituting (2.5) in (4.2) we obtain an expression for the operator Ah,η,ξ in η′(t)
and ξ
′
(t). We minimize Ah,η,ξ over the set of controls O(T ). As this operator is
linear in η
′
(t) and ξ
′
(t), we guess that the coefficient of the terms η
′
(t) and ξ
′
(t)
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vanish1 leading to
hˆ(t) = −(ΣΣ′)−1ΣΛ′Du(t, x).
Motivated by Kuroda and Nagai [26], we will try the functional form for u given by
u(t, x) = 12x
TQ(t)x + qT (t)x + k(t) where Q is an n × n symmetric matrix, q is a
n-element column vector and k is a scalar. Hence,
hˆ(t) = −(ΣΣ′)−1ΣΛ′(Q(t)X(t) + q(t)). (4.4)
This when substituted in (4.3) yields,
−ΣΛ′(Q(t)X(t) + q(t)) = δ(t)− Σ(ηˆ′(t)X(t) + ξˆ′(t)). (4.5)
which further yields,
ηˆ(t) = (Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
+A
′
)(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ,
ξˆ(t) =
(
(a− r(t)1)′ + q′(t)ΛΣ′
)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ.
 (4.6)
Thus hˆ is a local maximizing control and (ηˆ, ξˆ) is a local minimizer control that
constitutes the saddle-point equilibrium for game (GII).
Remark 3 From Remark 2 and equation (4.6), it can be seen that Pηˆ,ξˆ is a minimal
martingale measure provided Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ = 0 and q′(t)ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1Σ = 0 for
t ≤ T .
Remark 4 From Remark 3, and equation (4.4) it is clear that if the game equi-
librium measure corresponds to the minimal martingale measure then the optimal
investor strategy satisfies hˆ
′
(t)Σ = 0. Hence if the portfolio model does not permit
short selling then the optimal investor strategy at game equilibrium is the no-regret
strategy i.e (hˆ(t)=0).
Remark 5 In the case where the factor process and the security(stock) price pro-
cess has independent noise i.e ΣΛ
′
=0 , then from Remarks 3-4, it is obvious that at
1This is a situation typical in bang-bang type stochastic control problems. The optimal control
value depends on the the sign that their corresponding coefficient take or whether these coefficients
altogether vanish from the expression (4.2). Note that controls ξ, η are bounded and hence cannot
blow-up in finite time. Moreover, from Remark 2 we require that X be stable under the MMM
Pη=ηˆ,ξ=ξˆ. These insights makes us guess that the optimal controls ηˆ(t), ξˆ(t) can be chosen such
that their corresponding coefficients in (4.2) vanish. See also [28]. Hence the conditions that
subsequently guarantee that Pηˆ,ξˆ is a MMM also infact, from Remark 3 guarantee that the factor
process X is stable under the MMM. This satisfies our objective of determining ηˆ, ξˆ such that X is
stable under Pηˆ,ξˆ.
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optimality, the worst case strategy is the no-regret strategy and the factor process
always evolves under the minimal martingale measure since the game equilibrium
measure is the minimal martingale measure.
As in Kuroda and Nagai [26], we can verify that u(t, x) = 12x
′
Q(t)x+q
′
(t)x+
k(t) satisfies the HJB PDE i.e conditions (1)-(4) of the Proposition provided
• an n× n symmetric non-negative matrix Q satisfies the following matrix Riccati
equation given as
dQ(t)
dt
−Q(t)K0Q(t) +K ′1Q(t) +Q(t)K1 = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Q(T ) = 0. (4.7)
where
K0 =
θ
2
Λ
(
I − θ − 2
θ
Σ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ
)
Λ
′
,
K1 = B − Λη′(t)− ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1A.
• The n element column vector q(t)satisfies the following linear ordinary differential
equation
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
dq(t)
dt
+ (K
′
1 −Q(t)K0)q(t) +Q(t)b−Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r(t)1)
+ Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1Σ(η
′
(t) + ξ
′
(t))− ξ(t)Λ′Q(t) = 0,
q(T ) = 0. (4.8)
• and the constant k(t) is a solution to
dk(t)
dt
+ b
′
q(t) +
θ − 2
4
q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t),
+ r − q′(t)ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1(a− r(t)1) + q′(t)ΛΣ′(ΣΣ′)−1Σ(η′(t) + ξ′(t)),
− ξ(t)Λ′q(t) + 2− θ
4
q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t) = 0,
,∀0 ≤ t ≤ T,
k(T ) = log(v). (4.9)
The fourth condition of the proposition is obvious from the terminal conditions of
Q, q and k. To show that condition (5) of the proposition is satisfied by the choice
of our payoff function, we need to show that Eh,(η,ξ)(< Du˜ ΛeZ , Du˜ ΛeZ >t) < ∞
∀t ∈ [0, T ]. To show this we argue as follows. Processes Q , (Q(t))0≤t≤T and
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q , (q(t))0≤t≤T are bounded since they are continuous on the compact support [0, T ].
By a standard existence-uniqueness argument for stochastic differential equation
(refer Gihman and Skorokhod [22]), X ∈ L2(Ph,(η,ξ)). Since Du˜ is linear in X with
controls (η, ξ) assumed bounded, we also have that Du˜ ∈ L2(Ph,η,ξ). To complete
the argument it remains to be shown that u˜ is bounded. We show this now.
Lemma 4. 0 < u˜ < exp(− θ2
∫ T−t
0 r(s+ t)ds)v
−θ/2.
Proof From the definition of u˜ in (2.11), for any optimal control O(T ), the strategy
hˆ(t) = 0 for t ≤ T is sub-optimal, and hence will provide an upper bound on u˜.
Formally,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), h(s), ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
≤ E0,ηˆ,ξˆ[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), 0, ηˆ(s), ξˆ(s), r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
≤ E0,0,0[exp{θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(X(s), 0, 0, 0, r(s+ t); θ)ds}v−θ/2],
= exp(−θ
2
∫ T−t
0
r(s+ t)ds)v−θ/2.
Hence the conclusion follows.
We now formalize the solution to this game (GI).
Step 4:
We first show that the controls belonging to H(T ) and O(T ) satisfy the following
change of measure criterion.
Lemma 5. From the choice of space of controls h ∈ H(T ) and (η, ξ) ∈ O(T ), we
have
E[E
(
− θ
2
∫
0
[(Q(t)X(t) + q(t))Λ + h
′
(t)Σ]dW η,ξ(t)
)
T
] = 1. (4.10)
Proof Above result holds if the following Kazamaki condition,
E[exp(
∫ t
0 θ(
(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))Λ+h
′
(s)Σ
2 )dW
η,ξ(s))] < ∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] is satisfied. By an
application of Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] ,
E[exp(
∫ t
0
θ(
(Q(s)X(s) + q(s))Λ + (h
′
(s)Σ)
2
)dW η,ξ(s))]
≤ (E[e
∫ t
0 θ(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))ΛdW
η,ξ(s)])1/2 × (E[e
∫ t
0 θ(h
′
(s)Σ)dW η,ξ(s)])
1/2
Since X is a Gaussian process, mimicking arguments similar to Lemma 1, we have
that
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(E[e
∫ t
0 θ(Q(s)X(s)+q(s))ΛdW
η,ξ
s ])1/2 <∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. From assumption on the space of
controls H(T ), one can conclude that (E[e
∫ t
0 θ(h
′
(s)Σ)dW η,ξ(s)])
1/2
<∞ for t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence the Kazamaki condition holds true and the conclusion follows.
We now show that the saddle-point equilibrium controls obtained by solving
game (GII) is in fact also a saddle-point equilibrium for the original game problem
(GI).
Lemma 6. If there exist a solution Q to the matrix Ricatti equation (4.7) , then
the saddle point equilibrium strategies hˆ and (ηˆ, ξˆ) obtained from (4.4) and (4.6)
respectively as a result of solving the auxiliary game (GII) where q is a solution to
(4.8) and and k is a solution of (4.9) is in fact also the saddle-point equilibrium for
the finite horizon game (GI), namely,
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) = inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ),
= J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ; θ, )
=
1
2
x
′
Q(0)x+ q
′
(0)x+ k(0).
where,
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ; θ) , −2
θ
logEη,ξ[exp [
−θ
2
log V h,η,ξ(T )]].
Proof
Define,
Z¯s = Z¯s(h, η, ξ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(X(τ), h(τ), η(τ), ξ(τ), r(t+ τ); θ)dτ − (h′(τ)Σ)dW η,ξ(τ)
− θ
4
(h
′
(τ)Σ)
′
(h
′
(τ)Σ)dτ
}
. (4.11)
Also define, χ(t, x) = − θ2(u(t, x) − log v). From some straightforward calculations
provided in the Appendix we obtain the following relation,
exp{χ(T,X(T − t)) + Z¯(T − t)} = exp(χ(t, x)) exp
[ ∫ T−t
0
−θ
2
(Ah,η,ξu(t+ s,Xs))ds
−
∫ T−t
0
θ
2
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
(t)Σ)]dW η,ξt
−
∫ T−t
0
θ2
8
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
(t)Σ)][Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ h
′
(t)Σ]
′
ds
]
.
(4.12)
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We have shown that the saddle-point equilibrium strategies hˆ and (ηˆ, ξˆ) deduced by
solving game (GI) with corresponding game payoff function u satisfies conditions
(1)-(5) of the Proposition 2 . Therefore from condition(4) of the Proposition 2 ,
we have χ(T, x) = 0. Moreover (V h,η,ξ(T ))
−θ/2
= v−θ/2eZ¯T . Setting t = 0 and tak-
ing condition (1) of the Proposition 2 into account for η = ηˆ, ξ = ξˆ, and for any
h ∈ H(T ) we see from (4.11) that
(V h,η,ξ(T ))
−θ/2 ≥ e− θ2u(0,x) exp
[
−
∫ T
0
θ
2
[Du(s,X(s))
′
Λ + h
′
(s)Σ]dW η,ξ(s)
−
∫ T
0
θ2
8
[Du(s,X(s))
′
+ h
′
(s)Σ][Du(s,X(s))
′
+ h
′
(s)Σ]
′
ds
]
.
Now by taking expectations w.r.t to the physical probability measure Pη,ξ on both
sides of above equation and using Lemma 5, we obtain
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≤ u(0, x).
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ). Hence we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≤ u(0, x).
Hence we have,
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≤ sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≤ u(0, x). (4.13)
Likewise, setting t = 0 and taking condition (2) and condition (5) of the Proposition
2 into account we see that
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≥ u(0, x) ≥ inf
(η,ξ)∈O(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ). (4.14)
Similarly ,setting t = 0 and taking condition (3) and (5) of the Proposition 2 into
account for h = hˆ, γ = γˆ such that hˆ ∈ H(T ) and (ηˆ, ξˆ) ∈ O(T ) we see that
J˜(v, hˆ, ηˆ, ξˆ, T ) = u(0, x). (4.15)
From (4.13)-(4.15) and the fact that
suph∈H(T ) inf(η,ξ)∈O(T ) J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) ≤ inf(η,ξ)∈O(T ) suph∈H(T ) J˜(v, h, η, ξ, T ) is au-
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tomatically true, we conclude that the saddle-point equilibrium controls obtained
by solving game (GII) in fact also constitutes saddle-point strategy for the original
game (GI).
APPENDIX
As part of the proof of Lemma 5
Let χ(t, x) = − θ2(u(t, x) − log v) and Lu(t, x) = 12 tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x)) + (b + Bx −
Λ(η
′
x+ ξ
′
))
′
Du(t, x)
Then we have
dχ(t+ s,X(s)) = −θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
+ Lu)(t+ s,X(s))ds− θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s).
d exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))}
exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))} = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,X(s))− θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s)
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds,
d exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))} exp{Z(s)}
exp{χ(t+ s,X(s))} exp{Z(s)} = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,X(s))
− θ
2
Du(t+ s,X(s))
′
ΛdW η,ξ(s)
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds
+
θ
2
g(X(t), h(t), η(t), ξ(t), r(s+ t); θ)ds
− θ
2
h
′
(s)ΣdW η,ξ(s) +
θ2
4
h
′
(s)ΣΛ
′
Du(t+ s,X(s))ds
Integrating the above equation yields (4.12).
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Chapter 4
Sufficient stochastic maximum
principle for the optimal control
of semi-Markov modulated
jump-diffusion with an
application to financial
optimization.
Abstract
The finite state semi-Markov process is a generalization of the Markov chain in which
the sojourn time distribution is any general distribution. In this chapter we provide
a sufficient stochastic maximum principle for the optimal control of a semi-Markov
modulated jump-diffusion process in which the drift, diffusion and the jump kernel
of the jump-diffusion process is modulated by a semi-Markov process. We also con-
nect the sufficient stochastic maximum principle with the dynamic programming
equation. We apply our results to a finite-horizon, risk-sensitive control portfolio
optimization problem and to a quadratic loss-minimization problem.
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1 Introduction
The stochastic maximum principle is a stochastic version of the Pontryagin max-
imum principle which states that the any optimal control must satisfy a system
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, called the optimality system,
and should maximize a functional, called the Hamiltonian. The converse indeed
is true and gives the sufficient stochastic maximum principle. In this chapter we
will derive sufficient stochastic maximum principle for a class of process called as
the semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion process. In this process the drift, the
diffusion and the jump kernel term is modulated by an semi-Markov process.
An early investigation of stochastic maximum principle and its application
to finance has been credited to Cadenillas and Karatzas [5]. Framstadt et al. [19]
formulated the stochastic maximum principle for jump-diffusion process and ap-
plied it to a quadratic portfolio optimization problem. Their work has been partly
generalized by Donnelly [13] who considered a Markov chain modulated diffusion
process in which the drift and the diffusion term is modulated by a Markov chain.
Zhang et al. [34] studied sufficient maximum principle of a process similar to that
studied by Donnelly additionally with a jump term whose kernel is also modulated
by a Markov chain. It can be noted that the Markov modulated process has been
quite popular with its recent applications to finance for example options pricing
(Deshpande and Ghosh [12]) and references therein and to portfolio optimization
refer Xhou and Yin [35]. However application of semi-Markov modulated process
to portfolio optimization in which the portfolio wealth process is a semi-Markov
modulated diffusion are not many, see for example Ghosh and Goswami [20]. Even
so it appears that the sufficient maximum principle has not been formulated for
the case of a semi-Markov modulated diffusion process with jumps and studied fur-
ther in the context of quadratic portfolio optimization. Moreover, application of
the sufficient stochastic maximum principle in the context of risk-sensitive control
portfolio optimization with the portfolio wealth process following a semi-Markov
modulated diffusion process has not been studied. This chapter aims to provide
these missing dots and connect them together. For the same reasons, along with
providing a popular application of the sufficient stochastic maximum principle to a
quadratic- loss minimization problem when the portfolio wealth process follows a
semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion, we also provide an example of risk-sensitive
portfolio optimization for the diffusion part of the said dynamics.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we formally describe
basic terminologies used in the chapter. In section 3 we detail the control problem
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that we are going to study. The sufficient maximum principle is proven in Section
4. This is followed by establishing its connection with the dynamic programming.
We conclude the chapter by illustrating its applications to risk-sensitive control
optimization and to a quadratic loss minimization problem.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
We adopt the following notations that are valid for the whole paper:
• Let R: be the reals
• r,M : be any positive integers greater than 1.
• X = {1, ...,M}.
• C1,2,1([0, T ]×Rr×X×R+): denote the family of all functions on [0, T ]×Rr×X×R+
which are twice continuously differentiable in x and continuously differentiable in t
and y.
• v′ , A′ : the transpose of the vector v and matrix A respectively.
• ||v||: Euclidean norm of a vector v.
• |A|: norm of a matrix A.
• tr(A): trace of a square matrix A.
• Cmb (Rr): Set of real, m-times continuously-differentiable functions which are
bounded together with their derivatives up to the mth order.
We assume that the probability space (Ω,F , {F(t)},P) is complete with fil-
tration {F(t)}t≥0 and is right-continuous and F(0) contains all P null sets. Let
{θ(t)}t≥0 be a semi-Markov process adapted to the filtration and takes values in X
with transition probability pij with conditional holding time distribution F
h(t|i).
Thus if 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... are the times when jumps occur, then
P (θ(tn+1) = j, tn+1 − tn ≤ t|θ(tn) = i) = pijF h(t|i). (2.1)
Further, we assume the matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M} is irreducible and for each i, F h(·|i)
has continuously differentiable and bounded density fh(·|i). For a fixed t, let
n(t) , max{n : tn ≤ t} and Y (t) , t − tn(t). Thus Y (t) represents the amount
of time the proess θ(t) is at the current state after the last jump. The process
(θ(t), Y (t))defined on (Ω,F ,P) is jointly Markov and the differential generator L
given as follows (Chap.2, [22])
Lφ(i, y) = d
dy
φ(i, y) +
fh(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)
∑
j 6=i,j∈X
pij [φ(j, 0)− φ(i, y)]. (2.2)
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for φ : X × R+ → R a C1 function.
We first represent the semi-Markov process θ(t) as a stochastic integral with
respect to a Poisson random measure. With that aim in mind, embed X in RM by
identifying i with ei ∈ RM . For y ∈ [0,∞) i, j ∈ X , define
λij(y) = pij
fh(y/i)
1− F h(y/i) ≥ 0 and ∀ i 6= j,
λii(y) = −
M∑
j∈X ,j 6=i
λij(y) ∀ i ∈ X .
For i 6= j ∈ X , y ∈ R+ let Λij(y) be consecutive (with respect to lexico-
graphic ordering on X×X ) left-closed, right-open intervals of the real line, each hav-
ing length λij(y). Define the functions h¯ : X×R+×R→ Rr and g¯ : X×R+×R→ R+
by
h¯(i, y, z) =
{
j − i if z ∈ Λij(y)
0 otherwise
g¯(i, y, z) =
{
y if z ∈ Λij(y), j 6= i
0 otherwise
LetM(R+×R) be the set of all nonnegative integer-valued σ-finite measures
on Borel σ-field of (R+ × R). The process {θ˜(t), Y (t)} is defined by the following
stochastic integral equations:
θ˜(t) = θ˜(0) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
h¯(θ˜(u−), Y (u−), z)N1(du, dz),
Y (t) = t−
∫ t
0
∫
R
g¯(θ˜(u−), Y (u−), z)N1(du, dz),
(2.3)
where N1(dt, dz) is an M(R+ × R)-valued Poisson random measure with inten-
sity dt m(dz) independent of the X -valued random variable θ˜(0), where m(·) is
Lebesgue measure on R. As usual, by definition, Y (t) represents the amount of time
process θ˜(t) is at the current state after the last jump. We define the correspond-
ing compensated or centered one- dimensional Poisson measure as N˜1(ds, dz) =
N1(ds, dz) − dsm(dz). It was shown in Theorem 2.1 of Ghosh and Goswami [20]
that θ˜(t) is a semi-Markov process with transition probability matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M}
with conditional holding time distributions F h(y|i). Since by definition, θ(t) is also
a semi-Markov process with transition probability matrix [pij ]{i,j=1,...,M} with condi-
tional holding time distributions F h(y|i) defined on the same underlying probability
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space, by equivalence, θ˜(t) =d θ(t) for t ≥ 0.
Remark 1 The semi-Markov process with conditional density fh(y|i) = λ˜ie−λ˜iy
for some λ˜i > 0, i = 1, 2...,M , is in fact a Markov chain.
3 The control problem
Let U ⊂ Rr be a closed subset. Let B0 be the family of Borel sets Γ ⊂ Rr whose
closure Γ¯ does not contain 0. For and Borel set B ⊂ Γ, one dimensional poisson
random measure N(t, B) counts the number of jumps on [0, t] with values in B.
For a predictable process u : [0, T ] × Ω → U with left continuous right limit paths,
consider the controlled process X with given initial condition X(0) = x ∈ Rr given
by
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dW (t)
+
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t)), γ)N(dt, dγ), (3.1)
where X(t) ∈ Rr and W (t) = (W1(t), ...,Wr(t)) is r-dimensional standard Brow-
nian motion. The coefficients b(·, ·, ·, ·) : [0, T ] × Rr × U × X → Rr,σ(·, ·, ·, ·) :
[0, T ]×Rr ×U ×X → Rr ×Rr and g(·, ·, ·, ·, ·) : [0, T ]×Rr ×U ×X × Γ→ Rr and
satisfy the following conditions,
Assumption (A1)
(At most linear growth) There exists a constant C1 <∞ for any i ∈ X such that
|σ(t, x, u, i)|2 + ||b(t, x, u, i)||2 + ∫R ||g(t, x, u, i, γ)||2λ(dγ) ≤ C1(1 + ||x||2)
(Lipschitz continuity) There exists a constant C2 <∞ for any i ∈ X such that
|σ(t, x, u, i)− σ(t, y, u, i)|2 + ||b(t, x, u, i)− b(t, y, u, i)||2
+
∫
Γ
||g(t, x, u, i, γ)− g(t, y, u, i, γ)||2λ(dγ) ≤ C2||x− y||2
∀x, y ∈ Rr.
Then X(t) is a unique cadlag adapted solution given by (3.1)[refer Theorem 1.19 of
[30]].
Define a(t, x, u, i) = σ(t, x, u, i)σ′(t, x, u, i) is a Rr×r matrix and akl(t, x, u, i)
is the (k, l)th element of the matrix a while bk(t, x, u, i) is the k
th element of the vector
b(t, x, u, i). We assume that N(·, ·), N1(·, ·) and θ0,Wt, X0 defined on (Ω,F ,P) are
independent. For future use we define the compensated Poisson measure N˜(dt, dγ) =
N(dt, dγ)−λ(dγ)dt, where λ(·) is the jump distribution (so a probability measure)
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and 0 < λ <∞ is the jump rate such that ∫Γ min(||γ||2, 1)λ(dγ) <∞.
Consider the performance criterion
Ju(x, i, y) = Ex,i,y[
∫ T
0
f1(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t))dt+ f2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))], (3.2)
where f1 : [0, T ]× Rr × U × X × R+ → R is continuous and f2 : Rr ×X × R+ → R
is concave. We say that u ∈ A(T ) is the admissible class of controls, if
Ex,i,y
[ ∫ T
0
|f1(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t))|dt+ f2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))]
]
<∞.
The problem is to maximize Ju over all u ∈ A(T ) so we seek uˆ ∈ A(T ) such that
J uˆ(x, i, y) = sup
u∈A(T )
Ju(x, i, y), (3.3)
where uˆ is an optimal control.
Define a Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]× Rr × U × X × R+ × Rr × Rr×r × Rr → R by,
H(t, x, u, i, y, p, q, η) := f1(t, x, u, i, y) +
(
b
′
(t, x, u, i)−
∫
Γ
g
′
(t, x, u, i, γ)pi(dγ)
)
p
+ tr(σ
′
(t, x, u, i)q) +
(∫
Γ
g
′
(t, x, u, i, γ)pi(dγ)
)
η. (3.4)
We assume that the Hamiltonian H is differentiable with respect to x. The adjoint
equation corresponding to u and Xu in the unknown adapted processes p(t) ∈
Rr,q(t) ∈ Rr×r, η : R+ × Rr − {0} → Rr and η˜(t, z) = (η(1)(t, z), ..., η(r)(t, z))′ ,
where η˜(n)(t, z) ∈ Rr×r for each n = 1, 2, ..., r, is the backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE),
dp(t) = −∇xH(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ))dt+ q′(t)dW (t) +
∫
Γ
η(t, γ)N˜(dt, dγ)
+
∫
R
η˜(t, z)N˜1(dt, dz),
p(T ) = ∇xf2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T )). a.s. (3.5)
We have assumed that H is differentiable with respect to x = X(t) and its derivative
is denoted as ∇xH(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ)).
As per Remark 1, for the special case where the semi-Markov process has
exponential holding time distribution, we would have (3.5) to be a BSDE with
Markov chain switching. For this special case, Cohen and Elliott [6] have provided
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conditions for uniqueness of the solution. However, the corresponding uniqueness
result for the semi-Markov modulated BSDE as in (3.5) seems not available in the
literature. Since this paper concerns sufficient conditions, we will assume ad hoc
that a solution to this BSDE exists and is unique.
Remark 2 Notice that there are jumps in the adjoint equation (3.5) attributed
to jumps in the semi-Markov process θ(t). This is because the drift, the diffusion
and the jump kernel of the process X(t) is modulated by a semi-Markov process.
Also note that the unknown process η˜(t, z) in the adjoint equations (3.5) does not
appear in the Hamiltonian (3.4).
4 Sufficient Stochastic Maximum principle
In this section we state and prove the sufficient stochastic maximum principle.
Theorem 1(Sufficient Maximum principle) Let uˆ ∈ A(T ) with corresponding solu-
tion Xˆ , X uˆ. Suppose there exists a solution (pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ), ˆ˜η(t, z))of the adjoint
equation (3.5) satisfying
E
∫ T
0
||
(
σ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t))− σ(t,Xu(t), θ(t))
)′
pˆ(t)||2dt <∞ (4.1)
E
∫ T
0
||qˆ′(t)
(
Xˆ(t)−Xu(t)
)
||2dt <∞ (4.2)
E
∫ T
0
||(Xˆ(t)−Xu(t))′ ηˆ(t, γ)||2pi(dγ)dt <∞ (4.3)
E
∫ T
0
|
(
Xˆ(t)−Xu(t)
)′
ˆ˜η(t, z)|2m(dz)dt <∞. (4.4)
for all admissible controls u ∈ A(T ). If we further suppose that
1.
H(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, ·)) = sup
u∈A(T )
H(t, Xˆ(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, ·)).
(4.5)
2. for each fixed (t, i, y) ∈ ([0, T ]×X×R+), Hˆ(x) := supu∈A(T )H(t, x, u, i, y, pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, ·))
exists and is a concave function of x. Then uˆ is an optimal control.
Proof Fix u ∈ A(T ) with corresponding solution X = Xu. For sake of brevity we
will henceforth represent (t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−)) by
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(t, Xˆ(t−)) and (t,X(t−), u(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−)) by (t,X(t−)). Then,
J(uˆ)− J(u) = E
(∫ T
0
(
f1(t, Xˆ(t))− f1(t,X(t))
)
dt
+ f2(Xˆ(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))− f2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))
)
.
By concavity of f2(·, i, y) we have for each i ∈ X , y ∈ R+ and (3.5) the inequalities,
E
(
f2(Xˆ(T ), θ(T ), Y (T )) − f2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))
)
≥ E
(
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′∇xf2(Xˆ(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))
)
≥ E
(
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′ pˆ(T )
)
.
which gives
J(uˆ)− J(u) ≥ E
∫ T
0
(
f1(t, Xˆ(t))− f1(t,X(t))
)
dt+ E
(
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′ pˆ(T )
)
.
(4.6)
We now expand the above equation (4.6) term by term. For the first term in this
equation we use the definition of H as in (3.4) to obtain
E
∫ T
0
(
f1(t, Xˆ(t))− f1(t,X(t))
)
dt
= E
∫ T
0
(
H(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), θ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ))
− H(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ))
)
dt
− E
∫ T
0
[(
b(t, Xˆ(t))− b(t,X(t))
−
∫
Γ
(
g(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)− g(t,X(t−), u(t−), θ(t−), γ)
)
pi(dγ)
)
pˆ(t)
+ tr
(
(σ(t, Xˆ(t))− σ(t,X(t)))′ qˆ(t)
)
+
∫
Γ
(g(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)− g(t,X(t−), u(t−), θ(t−), γ))′η(t, γ)pi(dγ)
]
dt.
(4.7)
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To expand the second term on the right hand side of (4.6) we begin by applying the
integration by parts formula to get,
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′ pˆ(T ) =
∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(t))′dpˆ(t)
+
∫ T
0
pˆ
′
(t)d(Xˆ(t)−X(t)) + [Xˆ −X, pˆ](T ).
Substitute for X, Xˆ and pˆ from (3.1) and (3.5) respectively to obtain,
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′ pˆ(T )
=
∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(t))′
(
−∇xH(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ))dt+ qˆ′(t)dW (t)
+
∫
Γ
ηˆ(t, γ)N˜(dt, dγ) +
∫
R
ˆ˜η(t, z)N˜1(dt, dz)
)
+
∫ T
0
pˆ
′
(t)
{((
b(t, Xˆ(t))− b(t,X(t))
)
−
∫
Γ
(
g(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)
− g(t,X(t−), u(t−), θ(t−), γ)
)
pi(dγ)
)
dt
+
(
σ(t, Xˆ(t))− σ(t,X(t))
)′
dW (t)
+
∫
Γ
(
g(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)− g(t,X(t−), u(t−), θ(t−), γ)
)
N˜(dt, dγ)
}
+
∫ T
0
[
tr
(
qˆ
′
(t)
(
σ(t, Xˆ(t))− σ(t,X(t))
))
+
∫
Γ
(
g(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)− g(t,X(t), u(t−), θ(t−), γ)
)′
η(t, γ)pi(dγ)
]
dt.
Due to integrability conditions (4.1)-(4.4), the integral with respect to the Brownian
motion and the Poisson random measure are square integrable martingales which
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are null at the origin. Thus taking expectations we obtain
E
(
(Xˆ(T )−X(T ))′ pˆ(T )
)
=
∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−X(t))′
(
−∇xH(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ))
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
[
pˆ
′
(t)
(
b(t, Xˆ(t))− b(t,X(t))−
∫
Γ
(
g(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)
− g(t,X(t), u(t−), θ(t−), γ)
)
pi(dγ)
)
+
∫ T
0
tr
(
qˆ
′
(t)(σ(t, Xˆ(t))− σ(t,X(t)))
)
+
∫
Γ
((
g(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), u(t−), γ)− g(t,X(t−), θ(t−), u(t−), γ)
)′
η(t, γ))
)
pi(dγ)
]
dt.
Substitute the last equation and (4.7) into the inequality (4.6) to find after cancel-
lation that
J(uˆ)− J(u) ≥ E
∫ T
0
(
H(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), θ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ))
− H(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ))
− (Xˆ(t)−X(t))′∇xH(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), θ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t, γ))
)
dt.
(4.8)
We can show that the integrand on the RHS of (4.8) is non-negative a.s. for each
t ∈ [0, T ] by fixing the state of the semi-Markov process and then using the assumed
concavity of Hˆ(x), we apply the argument in Framstad et al. [19] . This gives
J(uˆ) ≥ J(u) and so uˆ is an optimal control.
5 Connection to dynamic programming
We show the connection between the stochastic maximum principle and dynamic
programming principle for the semi-Markov modulated regime switching jump diffu-
sion. This tantamounts to explicitly showing connection between the value function
V (t, x, i, y) of the control problem and the adjoint processes p(t), q(t) ,η(t, γ) and
η˜(t, z). In order to apply the dynamic programming principle we put the problem
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into a Markovian framework by defining
Ju(t, x, i, y) , EX(t)=x,θ(t)=i,Y (t)=y[
∫ T
t
f1(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t))dt+ f2(X(T ), θ(T ), Y (T ))],
(5.1)
and put
V (t, x, i, y) = sup
u∈A(T )
Ju(t, x, i, y) ∀ (t, x, i, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rr ×X × R+. (5.2)
Theorem 2 Assume that V (·, ·, i, ·) ∈ C1,3,1([0, T ] × Rr × X × R+) for each i, j ∈
X and that there exists an optimal Markov control uˆ(t, x, i, y) for (5.2), with the
corresponding solution Xˆ = X(uˆ). Define
pk(t) ,
∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)). (5.3)
qkl(t) ,
r∑
i=1
σil(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t), θ(t))
∂2V
∂xi∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)). (5.4)
η(k)(t, γ) , ∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), j, Y (t))− ∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), i, Y (t)). (5.5)
η˜(k)(t, z) , ∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− ∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−)). (5.6)
for each (k, l = 1, ..., r). Also we assume that the coefficients b(t, x, u, i), σ(t, x, u, i)
and g(t, x, u, i, γ) belong to C1b (Rr). Then p(t), q(t), η(t, γ) and η˜(t, z) solves the ad-
joint equation (3.5).
We prove this theorem by using the following Ito’s formula.
Theorem 3 Suppose r dimensional process X(t) = (X1(t), ..., Xr(t)) or {Xo(t)}
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indexed by (o = 1, 2, ..., r) satisfies the following equation,
dXo(t) = bo(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dt+
r∑
m=1
σom(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dWm(t)
+
∫
Γ
go(t,X(t−), u(t), θ(t−), γ)N(dt, dγ).
for some X(0) = x0 ∈ Rr a.s. . Further let us assume that the coefficients b, σ, g
satisfies the conditions of Assumption (A1).
Let V (·, ·, i, ·) ∈ C1,3,1([0, T ]× Rr × X × R+). Then the generalized Ito’s formula
is given by
V (t,X(t), θ(t), Y (t))− V (t, x, θ, y) =
∫ t
0
GV (s,X(s), θ(s), Y (s))ds
+
∫ t
0
(∇xV (s,X(s), θ(s), Y (s)))′σ(s,X(s), θ(s))dW (s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
Γ
[V (s,X(s−) + g(s,X(s−), u(s), θ(s−), γ), θ(s−), Y (s−))
− V (s,X(s−), θ(s−), Y (s−))]N˜(ds, dγ)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
[V (s,X(s−), θ(s−) + h¯(θ(s−), Y (s−), z), Y (s−)− g¯(θ(s−), Y (s−), z))
− V (s,X(s−), θ(s−), Y (s−))]N˜1(ds, dz),
where the local martingale terms are explicitly defined as
dM1(t) , (∇xV (t,X(t), θ(t), Y (t)))′σ(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t))dWt,
dM2(t) ,
∫
Γ
[V (t,X(t−) + g(t,X(t−), u(t), θ(t−), γ), θ(t−), Y (t−))
− V (t,X(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−))]N˜(dt, dγ),
dM3(t) ,
∫
R
[V
(
t,X(t−), θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z)
)
− V (t,X(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−))]N˜1(dt, dz),
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for
GV (t, x, i, y) =
∂V (t, x, i, y)
∂t
+
1
2
r∑
o,l=1
aol(t, x, i)
∂V (t, x, i, y)
∂xo∂xl
+
r∑
o=1
bo(t, x, i)
∂V (t, x, i, y)
∂xo
+
∂V (t, x, i, y)
∂y
+
fh(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)
M∑
j 6=i,j∈X ,i=1
pij [V (t, x, j, 0)− V (t, x, i, y)]
+λ
∫
Γ
(V (t, x+ g(t, x, i, γ), i, y)− V (t, x, i, y))pi(dγ), ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] , x ∈ Rr,
(i = 1, ....,M), y ∈ R+.
Proof For details refer to Theorem 5.1 in Ikeda and Watanabe [24].
Proof of Theorem 2 From the standard theory of dynamic programming the fol-
lowing HJB equation holds:
∂V
∂t
(t, x, i, y) + sup
u∈U
{f1(t, x, u, i, y) +AuV (t, x, i, y)} = 0,
V (T, x, i, y) = f2(x, i, y).
where Au is the infinitesimal generator of X and the supremum is attained by
uˆ(t, x, i, y). Define
F (t, x, u, i, y) = f1(t, x, u, i, y) +
∂V
∂t
(t, x, i, y) +AuV (t, x, i, y).
We assume that f1 is differentiable w.r.t to x. We use the Ito’s formula as described
in Theorem 3 to get,
F (t, x, u, i, y) = f1(t, x, u, i, y) +
∂V
∂t
(t, x, i, y)
+
r∑
k=1
∂V
∂xk
(t, x, i, y)bk(t, x, u, i)
+
1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂2V
∂xk∂xl
(t, x, i, y)
r∑
i=1
σki(t, x, u, i)σli(t, x, u, i)
+
M∑
j 6=i,i=1
pijf
h(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)(V (t, x, j, 0)− V (t, x, i, y)) +
∂V
∂y
(t, x, i, y)
+ λ
∫
Γ
(V (t, x+ g(t, x, u, i, γ), i, y)− V (t, x, i, y))pi(dγ). (5.7)
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Differentiating F (t, x, uˆ(t, x, i, y), i, y) with respect to xo and evaluate at x = Xˆ(t),
i = θ(t) and y = Y (t), we get,
0 =
∂f1
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), Y (t))
+
∂2V
∂xo∂t
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
+
r∑
k=1
∂2V
∂xo∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))bk(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
r∑
k=1
∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
∂bk
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂3V
∂xo∂xk∂xl
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
×
r∑
i=1
σk,i(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))σl,i(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂2V
∂xk∂xl
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), Y (t))
× ∂
∂xo
r∑
i=1
σk,i(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))σl,i(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
M∑
j 6=i,j∈X
pijf
h(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)
(
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), j, 0)− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), i, y)
)
+ λ
∫
Γ
(
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t) + g(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), γ), θ(t), Y (t))− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
)
pi(dγ).
(5.8)
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Next define, Yo =
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)) for (o = 1, ..., r). By Ito’s formula (Theo-
rem 3) we obtain the dynamics of Yo(t) as follows,
dYo(t) =
{
∂2V
∂xo∂t
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
+
r∑
k=1
∂2V
∂xo∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))bk(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂3V
∂xo∂xk∂xl
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
×
r∑
i=1
σki(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))× σli(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
+
M∑
j 6=i,j=1
pijf
h(y|i)
1− F h(y|i)(
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), j, 0)− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), i, y))
+ λ
∫
Γ
(
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t) + g(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), γ), θ(t), Y (t))
− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
)
pi(dγ)
}
dt
+
r∑
k=1
∂2V
∂xo∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
r∑
j=1
σkj(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))dWj(t)
+
∫
Γ
{
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−) + g(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t−), γ), θ(t−), Y (t−))
− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−))
}
N˜(dt, dγ)
+
∫
R
{
∂V
∂xo
((t,X(t−), θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z)))
− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−))
}
N˜1(dt, dz).
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We substitute ∂
2V
∂xo∂t
from (5.8) to get,
dYo(t) = −∂f1
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), Y (t)))
−
r∑
k=1
∂V
∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
∂bk
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
− 1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂2V
∂xk∂xl
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), Y (t))
× ∂
∂xo
(
r∑
k=1
σki(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t))σli(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t)))
+
r∑
k=1
∂2V
∂xo∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
r∑
j=1
σkj(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))dWj(t)
+
∫
Γ
{
(
∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−) + g(t,X(t−), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t−), γ), θ(t−), Y (t−))
− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−)))
}
N˜(dt, dγ)
+
∫
R
{
∂V
∂xo
((t,X(t−), θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z)))
− ∂V
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), Y (t−))
}
N˜1(dt, dz). (5.9)
We have the following identity,
1
2
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
∂2V
∂xk∂xl
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
× ∂
∂xo
( r∑
i=1
σki(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))σli(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
)
=
r∑
k=1
r∑
l=1
r∑
i=1
σil(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t))
∂2V
∂xi∂xk
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t))
× ∂σkl
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t)). (5.10)
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Next, from (3.4) we obtain,
∂H
∂xo
(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ))
=
∂f1
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t), Y (t))
+
r∑
i=1
(
∂bi
∂xo
(t, Xˆ(t−), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t−))
−
∫
Γ
∂gi
∂xo
(t,X(t−), uˆ(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), Y (t)), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
pi(t) + tr(
∂σ
′
(t, x, uˆ, θ(t))
∂xo
q)
+
r∑
i=1
∫
Γ
∂gi
∂xo
(t,X(t−), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ)(η(o)i (t, γ)). (5.11)
We also note that
tr(
∂σ
′
(t, x, u, i)
∂xo
q) =
r∑
l=1
[
∂σ
′
(t, x, u, i)
∂xo
q]ll
=
r∑
l=1
r∑
k=1
qk,l
∂σkl
∂xo
(t, x, u, i).
Substituting (5.3)-(5.6) and (5.11) gives,
dYo(t) = − ∂H
∂xo
(t,X(t), u(t), θ(t), Y (t), p(t), q(t), η(t, γ))dt+
r∑
j=1
qoj(t)dWj(t)
+
∫
Γ
η(t, γ)N˜(dt, dγ) +
∫
R
η˜(t, z)N˜1(dt, dz). (5.12)
Since Yo(t) = po(t) for each o = 1, ..., r, we have shown that p(t), q(t), η(t, γ) and
η˜(t, z) solve the adjoint equation (3.5).
6 Applications
We illustrate the theory developed by applying it to some key financial wealth op-
timization problems. For an early motivation on applying sufficient maximum prin-
ciple, we first consider wealth dynamics to follow semi-Markov modulated diffusion
(no jumps case) and apply it towards the risk-sensitive control portfolio optimization
problem. We follow it up by illustrating an application of semi-Markov modulated
jump-diffusion wealth dynamics to a quadratic loss minimization problem. Unless
otherwise stated, all the processes defined in this section are one dimensional.
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Risk-sensitive control portfolio optimization Let us consider a financial mar-
ket consisting of two continuously traded securities; namely the risk-less bond and
a stock. The dynamics of the riskless bond are:
dS0(t) = r(t, θ(t−))S0(t)dt S0(0) = 1.
where r(t, θ(t)) is the risk-free interest rate at time t and is modulated by an un-
derlying semi-Markov process as described earlier. The dynamics of the stock price
are
dS1(t) = S1(t)[(µ(t, θ(t−)))dt+ σ(t, θ(t−))dW (t)],
where (µ(t, θ(t−))) is the instantaneous expected rate of return and as usual σ(t, θ(t−))
is the instantaneous volatility rate. The stock price process is thus driven by a 1-d
Brownian motion. We denote the wealth of the investor to be X(t) ∈ R at time t.
He holds θ1(t) proportional units of stock and θ0(t) = 1− θ1(t) proportional units is
held in the riskless bond market. From the self-financing principle (refer Karatzas
and Shreve [25]), the wealth process follows the dynamics given as,
dX(t) = (r(t, θ(t−))X(t) + h(t)σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, θ(t−)))dt+ h(t)σ(t, θ(t−))dW (t)
X(0) = x,
where h(t) = θ1(t)S1(t), m¯(t, i) =
µ(t,i)−r(t,i)
σ(t,i) ≥ 0 and the variables r(t, i), b(t, i)
and σ(t, i), and σ−1(t, i) for each i ∈ X are measurable and uniformly bounded in
t ∈ [0, T ]. Also h(·) occuring in the drift and diffusion term in the above dynamics
satisfies the following conditions
1. E[
∫ T
0 h
2(t)dt] <∞
2. E[
∫ T
0 |r(t, θ(t−))X(t) + h(t)σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, θ(t−))|dt +
∫ T
0 h
2(t)σ2(t, θ(t−))dt] <
∞
3. The SDE for X has a unique strong solution.
In a classical risk-sensitive control optimization problem, the investor aims
to maximize over some admissible class of portfolio A(T ) the following risk-sensitive
criterion given by
J(hˆ(·), x) = max
h∈A(T )
1
γ
E[X(T )γ |X(0) = x, θ(0) = i, Y (0) = y], γ ∈ (1,∞)
= − min
h∈A(T )
1
γ
E[X(T )γ |X(0) = x, θ(0) = i, Y (0) = y],
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where the exogenous parameter γ is the usual risk-sensitive criterion that describes
the risk attitude of an investor. Thus the optimal expected utility function depends
on γ and is a generalization of the traditional stochastic control approach to utility
optimization in the sense that now the degree of risk aversion of the investor is
explicitly parameterized through γ rather than importing it in the problem via an
exogeneous utility function. See Whittle [33] for a general overview on risk-sensitive
control optimization. We now use the sufficient maximum principle (Theorem 1).
Set the control problem u(t) , h(t).
The corresponding Hamiltonian (for the non-jump case)(3.4) becomes,
H(t, x, u, i, p, q) = (r(t, i)x+ uσ(t, i)m¯(t, i))p+ uσ(t, i)q.
The adjoint process (3.5) is given by
dp(t) = −r(t, θ(t−))p(t)dt+ q(t)dW (t) +
∫
R
η˜(t, z)N˜1(dt, dz),
p(T ) = X(T )γ−1 a.s.. (6.1)
We need to determine p(t), q(t) and η(t, z) in (6.1). Going by the terminal condition
p(T ) we observe that the adjoint process p is the first derivative of (xγ). Hence we
assume that p(t),
p(t) = (X(t))γ−1eφ(t,θ(t),Y (t)).
where φ(T, θ(T ) = i, Y (T )) = 0 a.s. for each i ∈ {1, ...,M}. Using Ito’s formula
we get,
dp(t)
p(t)
=
M∑
i=1
1θ(t−)=i
(
(γ − 1)
(
r(t, θ(t−)) + u(t)σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, θ(t−))
X(t)
)
+
1
2
(γ − 1)(γ − 2)σ2(t, θ(t−)) u
2(t)
X2(t)
+ φt(t, θ(t−), y) + φy(t, θ(t−), y) + f
h(y|θ(t−) = i)
1− Fh(y|θ(t−) = i)
∑
j 6=i
pij(φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, θ(t−), y))
}
dt
+ (γ − 1) u(t)
X(t)
σ(t, θ(t−))dW (t)
+
∫
R
(
φ(t,X(t−), θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))
)
N˜1(dt, dz).
(6.2)
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Comparing the coefficients of (6.2) with that in (6.1) we get
−r(t, θ(t−)) =
M∑
i=1
1θ(t−)=i
(
(γ − 1)
(
r(t, θ(t−)) + u(t)σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, i)
X(t)
)
+
1
2
(γ − 1)(γ − 2) u
2(t)
X2(t)
+ φt(t, θ(t−), y) + φy(t, θ(t−), y)
+
fh(y|i)
1− F h(y|θ(t−) = i)
∑
j 6=i
pij(φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, θ(t−), y))
)
.
(6.3)
q(t) = (γ − 1) u(t)
X(t)
σ(t, θ(t−))p(t). (6.4)
η˜(t, z) =
(
φ(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))
)
p(t). (6.5)
Let uˆ ∈ A(T ) be a candidate optimal control corresponding to the wealth process
Xˆ and the adjoint triplet (pˆ, qˆ, ηˆ), then from the Hamiltonian (3.4) for all u ∈ R we
have
H(t, Xˆ(t), u, θ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t)) =
(
r(t, θ(t))Xˆ(t) + uσ(t, θ(t))m¯(t, θ(t))
)
pˆ(t) + uσ(t, θ(t))qˆ(t).
(6.6)
As this is a linear function of u, we guess that the coefficient of u vanishes at
optimality, which results in the equality
m¯(t, θ(t−))pˆ(t) + qˆ(t) = 0. (6.7)
Substitute equation (6.7) in (6.4) to obtain the expression for the control as
uˆ(t) =
m¯(t, θ(t−))
(1− γ)σ(t, θ(t−))Xˆ(t). (6.8)
We now aim to determine the explicit expression for p(t) which is only possible if
we can determine what φ(t, θ(t), Y (t)) is. We substitute uˆ from above and input it
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in equation (6.3) to get
0 = γr(t, θ(t−))− m¯2(t, θ(t−)) + (2− γ)
(1− γ)
m¯2(t, θ(t−))
2σ2(t, θ(t−))
+ φt(t, θ(t−), y) + φy(t, θ(t−), y) + f
h(y|θ(t−) = i)
1− Fh(y|θ(t−) = i)
M∑
i=1,j 6=i
pij(φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, θ(t−), y)).
(6.9)
with terminal boundary condition given as φ(T, θ(T ), Y (T )) = 0 a.s. Consider the
process
φ˜(t, θ(t), Y (t)) , E
[
exp
(∫ T
t
{
γr(s, θ(s))− m¯2(s, θ(s)) + (2−γ)(1−γ) m¯
2(s,θ(s))
2σ2(s,θ(s))
}
ds
)
|θ(t−) = i, Y (t−) = y
]
.
(6.10)
We aim to show that φ = φ˜. For the same we define the following martingale,
R(t) , E
[
exp
(∫ T
0
{
γr(s, θ(s))− m¯2(s, θ(s)) + (2− γ)
(1− γ)
m¯2(s, θ(s))
2σ2(s, θ(s))
}
ds
)
|Fθ,yt
]
,
(6.11)
where Fθ,yτ , σ{θ(τ), Y (τ), τ ∈ [0, t]} augmented with P null sets is the filtration
generated by the processes θ(t) and Y (t). From the {Fθ,yt }-martingale representation
theorem, there exist {Fθ,yt }-previsible, square integrable process ν(t, i, y) such that
R(t) = R(0) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
ν(τ, θ(τ−), Y (τ−))N˜1(dτ, dz). (6.12)
By positivity ofR(t) we can define νˆ(τ, θ(τ−), Y (τ−)) , (ν(τ, θ(τ−), Y (τ−)))R−1(τ−)
so that
R(t) = R(0) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
R(τ−)νˆ(τ, θ(τ−), Y (τ−))N˜1(dτ, dz). (6.13)
From the definition of φ˜ in (6.10) and the definition of R in (6.11) it is easy to see
that we have the following relationship
R(t) = φ˜(t, θ(t), Y (t)) exp
{∫ t
0
(γr(s, θ(s))− m¯2(s, θ(s)) + (2− γ)
(1− γ)
m¯2(s, θ(s))
2σ2(s, θ(s))
)ds
}
,
∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
(6.14)
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Using Ito’s expansion of φ˜(t, θ(t), Y (t)) to the RHS of (6.14) followed up by compar-
ing it with martingale representation of R(t) in (6.12) we get φ := φ˜. We can thus
substitute qˆ and ˆ˜η in expression (6.4),(6.5) in lieu of q and η˜(t, z) respectively. With
the choice of control uˆ given by (6.8) and boundedness condition on the market
parameters r, µ and σ, the conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied and hence uˆ(t) is
an optimal control process and the explicit representation of pˆ is given by
pˆ(t) = (X(t))γ−1eE[exp(
∫ T
t γr(s,θ(s))−m¯2(s,θ(s))+
(2−γ)
(1−γ)
m¯2(s,θ(s))
2σ2(s,θ(s))
ds|θ(t−)=i,Y (t−)=y)]
.
Quadratic loss minimization We now provide an example related to quadratic
loss minimization where the portfolio wealth process is given by
dXh(t) =
(
r(t, θ(t))Xh(t) + h(t)σ(t, θ(t))m¯(t, θ(t))− h(t)
∫
Γ
g(t,Xh(t), θ(t), γ)pi(dγ)
)
dt
+ h(t)σ(t, θ(t))dW (t) + h(t)
∫
Γ
g(t,Xh(t), θ(t), γ)N˜(dt, dγ),
Xh(0) = x0 a.s. (6.15)
where the market price of risk is defined as m¯(t, i, y) = σ−1(t, i)(b(t, i)− r(t, i)). As
in the earlier example , we have that m¯(t, i) ≥ 0 and that the variables r(t, i), b(t, i),
σ(t, i) , σ−1(t, i) and g(t, x, i, γ) for each i ∈ X are measurable and uniformly
bounded in t ∈ [0, T ]. We assume that g(t, x, i, γ) > −1 for each i ∈ X and for
a.a. t, x, γ. This insures that Xh(t) > 0 for each t. We further assume the following
conditions for each i ∈ X
1. E[
∫ T
0 h
2(t)dt] <∞.
2. E[
∫ T
0 |r(t, i)X(t) + h(t)σ(t, i)m¯(t, i)|dt+
∫ T
0 h
2(t)σ2(t, i)dt+
∫ T
0 h
2(t)g2(t,X(t), i, γ)dt] <
∞.
3. t→ ∫R h2(t)g2(t, x, i, γ)pi(dγ) is bounded.
4. the SDE for X has a unique strong solution.
The portfolio process h(·) satisfying the above four conditions is said to be admis-
sible and belongs to A(T ) (say). We consider the problem of finding an admissible
portfolio process h ∈ A(T ) such that
inf
h∈A(T )
E[(Xh(T )− d)2],
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over all h ∈ A(T ). Set the control process u(t) , h(t) and X(t) , Xh(t). For this
example the Hamiltonian (3.4) becomes
H(t, x, h, i, y, p, q, η) =
[
r(t, i)x+ uσ(t, i)m¯(t, i)− u
∫
Γ
g(t, x, i, γ)pi(dγ)
]
p+ uσ(t, i)q
+
(
u
∫
Γ
g(t, x, i, γ)pi(dγ)
)
η, (6.16)
and the adjoint equations are for all time t ∈ [0, T ),
dp(t) = −r(t, θ(t−))p(t)dt+ q(t)dW (t) +
∫
Γ
η(t, γ)N˜(dt, dγ) +
∫
R
η˜(t, z)N˜1(dt, dz),
p(T ) = −2X(T ) + 2d a.s. (6.17)
We seek to determine p(t), q(t), η(t, γ) and η˜(t, z) in (6.17). Going by (6.17) we
assume that
p(t) = φ(t, θ(t), Y (t))X(t) + ψ(t, θ(t), Y (t)). (6.18)
with the terminal boundary conditions being
φ(T, i, y) = −2 ψ(T, i, y) = 2d ∀ i ∈ X . (6.19)
For the sake of convenience we again rewrite the following Ito’s formula for a function
f(t, θ(t), y(t)) ∈ C1,2,1 given as
df(t, θ(t), Y (t)) =
(
∂f(t, θ(t), Y (t))
∂t
+
(fh(y/i))
(1− Fh(y/i))
M∑
j 6=i,j=1
pθ(t−)=i,j [f(t, j, 0)− f(t, θ(t−), y)] + ∂f(t, θ(t), Y (t))
∂y
)
dt
+
∫
R
[f(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))− f(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))]N˜1(dt, dz).
(6.20)
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We apply Ito’s product rule to (6.18) to obtain
dp(t) = X(t−)dφ(t, θ(t−), Y (t)) + φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))dX(t) + dφ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))dX(t) + dψ(t)
=
M∑
i=1
1θt−=i
{
X(t−)
(
φ(t, θ(t−), y)r(t, θ(t−)) + φt(t, θ(t−), Y (t)) + φy(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
+
M∑
i=1,j 6=i
pij
fh(y/i)
1− Fh(y/i) (φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t)))
)
+ u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, θ(t−))
− u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ) + ψt(t, θ(t−), Y (t)) + ψy(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
+
M∑
i=1,i6=j
pij
fh(y/i)
1− Fh(y/i) [ψ(t, j, 0)− ψ(t, θ(t−) = i, Y (t))]
}
dt
+ u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))σ(t, θ(t−))dW (t)
+ u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t−), θ(t−), γ)N˜(dt, dγ)
+
∫
R
[
X(t−)(φ(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−)))
+ ψ(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− ψ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))
]
N˜1(dt, dz).
(6.21)
Comparing coefficients with (6.17) we obtain three equations given as
− r(t, θ(t−))p(t−)
=
M∑
i=1
1{θt− = i, Y (t−) = y}
{
X(t−)
(
φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))r(t, θ(t−))
+ φt(t, θ(t−), Y (t)) + φy(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
+
M∑
i=1,j 6=i
pij
fh(y/i)
1− F h(y/i)(φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t)))
)
+ u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))σ(t, θ(t−))m¯(t, θ(t−))
− u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
∫
Γ
g(t, x, θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ) + ψt(t, θ(t−)), Y (t) + ψy(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
+
M∑
i 6=j
pij
fh(y/i)
1− F h(y/i) [ψ(t, j, 0)− ψ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))]
}
.
(6.22)
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q(t) = u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))σ(t, θ(t−)). (6.23)
η(t, γ) = u(t)φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))g(t,X(t−), θ(t−), γ). (6.24)
η˜(t, z) = X(t−)(φ(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))
− φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−))) + ψ(t, θ(t−) + h¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z), Y (t−)
− g¯(θ(t−), Y (t−), z))− ψ(t, θ(t−), Y (t−)).
(6.25)
Let uˆ ∈ A(T ) be a candidate optimal control corresponding to the wealth process
Xˆ(T ) and the adjoint triplet (pˆ, qˆ, ηˆ, ˆ˜η). Then from the Hamiltonian (3.4) for all
u ∈ A(T ) we have
H(t, Xˆ(t), u, θ(t), pˆ(t), qˆ(t), ηˆ(t)) =
(
r(t, θ(t))Xˆ(t) + uσ(t, θ(t))m¯(t, θ(t))
− u
∫
Γ
g(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)pid(γ)
)
pˆ(t)
+ uσ(t, θ(t))qˆ(t) +
(
u
∫
Γ
g(t, Xˆ(t−), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
ηˆ(t, γ).
(6.26)
As this is a linear function of u, we guess that the coefficient of u vanishes at
optimality, which results in the following equality
qˆ(t) =
(
− m¯(t, θ(t−)) + 1
σ(t, θ(t−))
∫
Γ
g(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), γ)pi(dγ)
)
pˆ(t)
− 1
σ(t, θ(t−))
∫
Γ
(g
′
(t, Xˆ(t), θ(t), γ))pi(dγ)ηˆ(t, γ).
(6.27)
Also substituting (6.27) for qˆ(t) in (6.23) and using (6.18) and(6.24) we get,
uˆ(t) =
Λ˜(t)
Λ(t)
(Xˆ(t) + φ−1(t, θ(t−), y)ψ(t, θ(t−), y)), (6.28)
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where
Λ(t) = σ2(t, θ(t−)) + φ(t, θ(t−), Y (t))
∫
Γ
g
′
(t,X(t), θ(t−), γ)g(t,X(t), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ).
Λ˜(t) = −m¯(t, θ(t−))σ(t, θ(t−)) +
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), θ(t−), γ)pi(dγ).
(6.29)
To find the optimal control it remains to find φ and ψ. To do so set X(t) :=
Xˆ(t), u(t) := uˆ(t) and p(t) := pˆ(t) in (6.22) and then substitute for pˆ(t) in (6.18)
and uˆ(t) from (6.28) . As this result is linear in Xˆ(t) we compare the coefficient on
both side of the resulting equation to get following two equations:
0 = 2rφ(t, i, Y (t)) + φt(t, i, Y (t)) + φy(t, i, Y (t)) +
M∑
i 6=j,i=1
pij
fh(y/i)
1− Fh(y/i) (φ(t, j, 0)− φ(t, i, Y (t)))
+
Λ˜(t)
Λ(t)
σ(t, i)m¯(t, i)φ(t, i, Y (t))− Λ˜(t)
Λ(t)
φ(t, i, Y (t))
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), i, γ)pi(dγ). (6.30)
0 = rψ(t, i, Y (t)) + ψt(t, i, Y (t)) + ψy(t, i, Y (t)) +
M∑
i 6=j,i=1
pij
fh(y/i)
1− Fh(y/i) (ψ(t, j, 0)− ψ(t, i, Y (t)))
+
Λ˜(t)
Λ(t)
σ(t, i)m¯(t, i)ψ(t, i, Y (t))− Λ˜(t)
Λ(t)
ψ(t, i, y)
∫
Γ
g(t,X(t), i, γ)pid(γ).
(6.31)
with terminal boundary conditions given by (6.19). Consider the following process
φ˜(t, i, y) = −2E
[
exp
{∫ T
t
(
2r(s, θ(s−)) + Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
σ(s, θ(s−))m¯(s, θ(s−))
− Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
∫
Γ
g(s,X(s), θ(s−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
ds
}
|(θ(s−) = i, Y (t) = y)
]
.
(6.32)
ψ˜(t, i, y) = 2dE
[
exp
{∫ T
t
(
r(θ(s−), s) + Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
σ(s, θ(s−))m¯(s, θ(s−))
− Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
∫
Γ
g(s,X(s), θ(s−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
ds
}∣∣∣∣(θ(s−) = i, Y (s) = y)].
(6.33)
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We aim to show that φ = φ˜ and ψ = ψ˜. We define the following martingales:
R(t) = E
[
exp
{∫ T
0
(
2r(s, θ(s−)) + Λ˜(s)Λ(s)σ(s, θ(s−))m¯(s, θ(s−))− Λ˜(s)Λ(s)
∫
Γ g(s,X(s), θ(s−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
ds
}
|Fθ,yt
]
,
(6.34)
S(t) = E
[
exp
{∫ T
0
(
r(s, θ(s−)) + Λ˜(s)Λ(s)σ(s, θ(s−))m¯(s, θ(s−))− Λ˜(s)Λ(s)
∫
Γ g(s,X(s), θ(s−), γ)pi(dγ)
)
ds
}
|Fθ,yt
]
,
(6.35)
where Fθ,yt is defined as usual. We follow steps similar to that as seen earlier in finite
horizon risk-sensitive optimization example and conclude that φ = φ˜ and ψ = ψ˜ by
using joint-Markov property of (θ(t), Y (t)), to obtain the following expression for
the control uˆ(t) given as
uˆ(t) = Λ˜(t)Λ(t)
(
Xˆ(t)−
dE
[
exp
{ ∫ T
t (r(s,θ(s−))+
Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
σ(s,θ(s−))m¯(s,θ(s−))− Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
∫
Γ g(s,X(s),θ(s−),γ)pi(dγ))ds
}
|(θ(t−)=i,Y (t)=y)
]
E
[
exp
{ ∫ T
t (2r(s,θ(s−))+
Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
σ(s,θ(s−))m¯(s,θ(s−))− Λ˜(s)
Λ(s)
∫
Γ g(s,X(s),θ(s−),γ)pi(dγ))ds
}
|(θ(t)=i,Y (t)=y)
] ).
For the choice of the control parameter and the boundedness conditions on the
market parameters r, b,σ and g, the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied and hence
uˆ is the optimal control process.
85
Bibliography
[1] A. Bensoussan, Stochastic control of Partially Observable Systems, Cambridge
University Press, 1992.
[2] Bielecki, T.R. and S.R Pliska (1999), Risk-sensitive dynamic asset management,
Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 39, 337-360.
[3] Bielecki, T. and S.R. Pliska (2003), Economic properties of the risk sensitive
criterion for portfolio management, Review of Accounting and Finance, 2(2),
3-17.
[4] Bielecki, T. and S.R. Pliska (2004), Risk sensitive intertemporal CAPM with
applications to fixed income management, IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, 49(3), 420-432.
[5] Cadenillas, A. and I. Karatzas (1995), The stochastic maximum principle for
linear, convex optimal control with random coefficients, SIAM Journal of Con-
trol and Optimization, 33(2), 590-624.
[6] Cohen, S.N. and R.J. Elliott (2010), Comparisons for backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations on Markov chains and related no-arbitrage conditions, An-
nals of Applied Probability, 20(1), 267-311.
[7] M.H.A. Davis, Linear Estimation and Stochastic Control, Chapman and Hall ,
1977.
[8] Davis, M.H.A and S. Lleo(2008), Risk–sensitive benchmarked asset manage-
ment, Quantitative Finance, 8(4), 415–426.
[9] A. Deshpande and S. D. Jacka (2014), A game theoretic approach to Risk-
sensitive control asset management, Forthcoming in Risk and Decision Analysis.
[10] A. Deshpande (2015), On the role of Fo¨llmer-Schweizer minimal martingale
measure in Risk Sensitive control Asset Management, Forthcoming in Journal
of Applied Probability, 52(3).
86
[11] A. Deshpande, Sufficient stochastic maximum principle for the optimal con-
trol of semi-Markov modulated jump-diffusion with application to Financial
optimization, Forthcoming in Stochastic Analysis and Applications, http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1080/07362994.2014.945038.
[12] Deshpande, A. and M.K Ghosh (2008), Risk minimizing option pricing in a
Markov modulated market, Stochastic Analysis and Applications, 26(1), 313–
324.
[13] C. Donnelly (2011), Sufficient Stochastic Maximum Principle in a Regime-
Switching Diffusion Model, Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 64(2), 155-
169.
[14] W. H. Fleming (1995), Optimal investment models and risk sensitive stochas-
tic control, in Mathematical Finance: IMA Volumes in Mathematics and its
Applications, 65, 75–88, Springer-Verlag, New York.
[15] Fleming, W.H. and S. J.Sheu (2002), Risk-sensitive Control and an Optimal
Investment Model II, Annals of Applied Probability, 12(2),730–767.
[16] Fleming, W. H. and P. Souganidis (1989), On the existence of value functions
of two player zero-sum stochastic differential games, Indiana University Math-
ematics Journal, 38 (2), 293–314.
[17] Fo¨llmer, H. and M. Schweizer (1991), Hedging of Contingent Claims under
Incomplete Information, in: M. H. A. Davis and R. J. Elliott (eds.), “Applied
Stochastic Analysis”, Stochastics Monographs, vol. 5, Gordon and Breach, Lon-
don/New York, 389–414.
[18] Fo¨llmer, H. and M. Schweizer (2010), The Minimal Martingale Measure, pub-
lished as “Minimal Martingale Measure” in: R. Cont (eds.), Encyclopedia of
Quantitative Finance, Wiley, 1200–1204.
[19] Framstad N.C., Oksendal,B. and A. Sulem (2004), Sufficient stochastic max-
imum principle for the optimal control of jump diffusions and applications to
finance, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 121(1), 77-98.
[20] Ghosh, M.K. and A. Goswami (2009), Risk minimizing option pricing in a semi-
Markov modulated market, SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 48(3),
1519–1541.
87
[21] I.V. Girsanov (1960), On transforming a certain class of stochastic processes
by absolutely continuous substitution of measures, Theory of Probability and
its Applications, 5, 285-301.
[22] Gihman, I.I. and A. Skorokhod , Stochastic Differential Equations, Springer-
Verlag, 1972.
[23] Heath, D. and E. Platen , A Benchmark Approach to Quantitative Finance,
Springer Finance, 2006.
[24] Ikeda, N. and S. Watanabe , Stochastic differential equations and diffusion
processes, North-Holland, 1981.
[25] Karatzas, I. and S.E. Shreve , Methods of Mathematical Finance, Springer,
1991.
[26] Kuroda, K. and H. Nagai (2002), Risk–sensitive portfolio optimization on infi-
nite time horizon, Stochastics and Stochastic Reports, 73, 309–331.
[27] Lefebvre, M. and P. Montulet (1994), Risk-sensitive optimal investment policy,
International Journal of Systems Science, 22, 183-192.
[28] Mataramvura, S. and B. Oksendal (2008), Risk minimizing portfolios and HJBI
equations for stochastic differential games, Stochastics: An International Jour-
nal of Probability and Stochastic Processes, 80(4), 317–337.
[30] B. Oksendal, Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications, 6th eds.,
Springer, 2003.
[30] Oksendal, B. and A. Sulem, Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions,
2nd edition, Springer Verlag, 2007.
[31] H. Pham, Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with Financial
Applications, Springer , 2009.
[32] Revuz, D. and M. Yor, Continuous Martingales and Brownian Motion, Springer,
2004.
[33] P. Whittle, Risk Sensitive Optimal Control, John Wiley and Sons, 1990.
[34] Zhang, X., Elliott, R.J. and T. K. Siu (2012), A Stochatic maximum principle
for a Markov regime switching jump-diffusion model and its application to
finance, SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 50(2), 964-990.
88
[35] Zhou, X.Y. and G. Yin (2003), Markowitzs mean-variance portfolio selection
with regime switching: A continuous-time model, SIAM Journal of Control and
Optimization, 42(4), 1466-1482.
89
